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Elian or Alien?
The Contradictions of Protecting
Undocumented Children under the
Special Immigrant Juvenile Statute
BY GREGORY ZHONG TIAN CHEN*
On November 25, 1999, a six-year-old boy named Elian
Gonzalez was rescued off the coast of Florida after surviving an ocean
voyage from Cuba.' Elian, whose mother died during that journey,
quickly became the subject of an intense international controversy
over whether he should be returned to his father in Cuba or allowed
to remain with his extended relatives in the United States.2 The
* Staff Attorney/Skadden Fellow, Legal Services for Children. I want to thank
Kathy Brady, Randy Hertz, Karen Jones-Mason, Martha Matthews, Chris Palamountain,
Bernard Perlmutter and Judith Resnik for their guidance and assistance in the
development and editing of earlier drafts of this article. I wish to acknowledge the
following practitioners and advocates for sharing the accounts of their clients' lives
without which this article could not have been written: Vibiana Andrade, Denise Baez,
Cherylle Corpuz, Lynn Coyle, Christoph Erhardt, Behzad Ghassemi, Juanita Kirshke,
Christina Kleiser, Zenobia Lai, Steven Lang, Angela Lloyd, Vanessa Melendez Lucas,
Alan Mishael, Halim Morris, Christopher Nugent, Susan Schmidt, Matt Wilch, and Wendy
Young. Finally, I am grateful to Joanne C. Lin for the support that made this article
possible.
1. See Gonzalez v. Reno, No. 00-206-CIV-Moore, at 2 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
2. See id. The INS placed Elian in the care of his paternal great uncle, Lazaro
Gonzalez. Id. For examples of the controversy engendered by the case, see David
Johnston, U.S. Set to Order A Speedy Return of Boy to Father, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 2000,
at Al (describing the "international embarrassment" and "domestic political headache"
caused by the Elian Gonzalez case); Hearing of the House International Relations
Comm., Fiscal Year 2001 State Dept. Foreign Affairs Budget February 16, 2000, Fed.
News Serv. (describing testimony of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright regarding the
State Department's communications with the Cuban government and the "international
repercussions" that may result from the case); Anita Snow, Cuba Government Ally
Criticizes Boy Order, Assoc. PRESS, Jan. 10, 2000 ("Thousands of protesters [in Havana,
Cuba] demanding the return of 6-year-old Elian Gonzalez fell silent Monday upon hearing
the announcement that an American [state court] judge had ordered the boy to stay in the
United States."); Tom Raum, Congress, Gore, Weigh in on Immigration Case, ASSOC.
PRESS, Jan. 10, 2000 (describing positions taken by several elected officials concerning the
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United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) took the
position that Elian should be returned to his father, relying heavily
upon U.S. family law principles regarding the importance of parental
rights, family reunification, and the child's best interest! Despite the
importance of family law principles, however, the INS asserted that it
had exclusive jurisdiction over Elian and that a state family court
lacked jurisdiction over the case.4
Although the extraordinary facts and political drama that
surrounded Elian made the case unique, the conflict over Elian raised
important questions about whether the federal government or a state
family court had legitimate authority to determine the custody and
Elian Gonzalez case, including Vice President Al Gore, Senators Jesse Helms and Robert
Torricelli, and House Representatives Benjamin Gilman and Dan Burton). On June 28,
2000, Elian was sent home to Cuba after federal agents seized him from the home of his
relatives in Miami and legal appeals by the relatives failed to reverse the INS's decision.
3. See Doris Meissner, Commissioner INS, INS Decision in the Elian Gonzalez Case
(visited Jan. 5, 2000) <http://www.ins.usdoj.gov> ("Both U.S. and international law
recognize the unique relationship between parent and child, and family reunification has
long been a cornerstone of both American immigration law and INS practice.... We urge
everyone involved to understand, respect and uphold the bond between parent and child
and the laws of the United States.") See also, Department of Justice and Immigration and
Naturalization Service Joint Statement on Federal Court Action Regarding Elian
Gonzalez, January 19, 2000 (stating that the INS decision "recognizes the bond that exists
between parent and child"); Elian Gonzalez, Department of Justice INS Statement, March
28, 2000 (urging "everyone involved to... respect and uphold the bond between parent
and child"). Indeed, family law principles were critical to the INS's decision because the
INS concluded that Elian's father was the appropriate adult to represent the six-year-old's
legal interests with regard to any petition for immigration status. See Gonzalez v. Reno,
No. 00-206-CIV-Moore, at 10 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (citing Letter from Attorney General Jane
Reno to Spencer Eig, Roger Bernstein and Linda Osberg-Braun of 1/12/00).
4. See Peter T. Kilborn, LN.S. Extends Boy's Stay in Miami as Judge's Links to Case
are Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2000, at A12. On January 10, 2000, a Florida state
court exercised jurisdiction over the case after Elian's great uncle sought a protective
order and legal guardianship over Elian. See Gonzalez v. Reno, Case No. 00-206-CIV-
Moore, at 3 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (citing Temporary Protective Order, In re Gonzalez v.
Gonzalez-Quintana, 00-00479 FC 29 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000). The state court granted
the uncle "'limited legal authority.., to assert and protect such rights as the child may
have under United States immigration law."' kl On April 13, 2000, the state court issued
a final order concluding that its jurisdiction was preempted by federal immigration law
and dismissed the uncle's action. See Final Order, In re Gonzalez v. Gonzalez-Quintana,
00-00479-FC-28, April 13, 2000 at 1, 8-12. Commentators questioned the state court's
initial decision exercising jurisdiction. See, e.g., Alex Veiga, Judge To Hear Cuba Boy
Arguments, ASSOc. PRESs, Jan. 10, 2000 (describing one legal commentator's opinion that
the state "judge's decision was 'politically popular,' but legally wrong"); Carol Rosenberg,
Government Can Still Reunite Elian Gonzalez with Father Friday, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
10, 2000 (describing immigration expert's view that "a local court has no authority to
decide the custody question" over Elian).
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placement status of an undocumented child. This article explores
disputes between federal and state authorities over the custody and
placement of undocumented minors who are abused, neglected, and
abandoned.6
Elian was fortunate since he had a father and extended relatives
willing to care for him and there was no indication that he suffered
from family abuse, neglect, or abandonment.7  Many other
undocumented children, however, are not so fortunate.8 Every year
hundreds of undocumented children are abused, neglected, or
abandoned by their parents or caregivers and therefore require the
assistance of state child welfare institutions.9 Some of these children
never receive the protection and services they need because they are
detained by the INS in inadequate facilities or live in the U.S.
unaware that child protective services exist.'"
Because the INS and state or local child welfare agencies both
have a legitimate interest in these children, conflicts have arisen
regarding which government institution has the authority to
5. "Undocumented" describes the status of being physically present in the U.S.
without legal permission. Some undocumented people enter the country by crossing the
border illegally. Others enter the country with legal permission that subsequently
becomes invalid either due to the person's conduct (such as by committing certain crimes)
or by operation of law (such as the expiration of a tourist visa).
6. The term "abuse, neglect and abandonment" describes the particular set of
experiences that may justify a state court's exercise of jurisdiction over a juvenile. The
legal terminology varies depending on the laws of each state, but for the purposes of this
article "abuse, neglect and abandonment" shall be used generally to describe this set of
experiences.
7. See Meissner, supra note 3 ("INS has not uncovered any information that might
call into question Mr. Gonzalez's parental and legal rights with regard to Elian's
immigration status....")
8. See Lissette Corsa, Orphans of the State, MIAMI NEW TIMES, Mar. 30, 2000
(describing the difficult conditions many undocumented minors suffer as compared to
trips to Disneyland and international "star appeal" bestowed upon Elian).
9. For example, in 1997, 430 undocumented children were granted SIJ status
because they had been abused, neglected or abandoned. See 1997 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 36 (1999).
10. Annually the INS detains several thousand undocumented minors. See Jo
Becker, The Other Immigrant Children, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 7, 2000 (reporting
approximately 5,000 minors detained in 1999). The INS detention rates for
unaccompanied children have varied significantly. In 1990, the INS reported detaining
8,500 unaccompanied minors. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 295 (1993). In 1995 this
number dropped to 2,028. See Patrick J. McDonnell, INS Adopts Reforms on Custody of
Minors, L.A. TIMES, April 30, 1997, at B1. The INS estimates that approximately 5
million undocumented immigrants were residing in the United States in October 1996 who
had not been identified by the INS. See Statistics: Illegal Alien Resident Population (visited
on Jan. 29, 2001) <http://www.ins.usdoj.gov>.
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determine where the children will live and how they will be treated.
One example is the case of Gustavo Sanchez who was born in
Honduras with severe developmental disabilities." His father died
when Gustavo was very young. Gustavo's mother physically abused
him, attacking him with her hands, belts, rocks, sticks, even a
machete. Gustavo fled the abusive home and eventually entered the
United States, illegally and alone. He came to the attention of the
Los Angeles child welfare system, was found by a state court to be
abused, neglected, and abandoned, was declared a dependent of the
court, and was placed in a foster home.12 In the ensuing months a
custody battle over Gustavo erupted between the INS and the Los
Angeles child welfare system.
Gustavo was both an undocumented immigrant and a child
survivor of family abuse and therefore qualified for a form of
immigration relief called Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status. 3
Enacted by Congress in 1990, the SIJ statute is designed to protect
undocumented children who have suffered family abuse, neglect, or
14abandonment. To qualify for protection under the SIJ statute, a
11. Interview with Vibiana Andrade, Mexican American Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Los Angeles, CA, (Jan. 21, 2000). The client's name has been altered.
12. The Superior Court sustained the petition filed on Gustavo's behalf pursuant to
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a), (b), (c) and (g). See Minute Order, In the Matter of
No. CK 31554, Hearing Date Jan. 30, 1998, Superior Court of California of Los Angeles,
Juvenile Court (on file with the author).
13. See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J) (1999). The SIJ provision was originally enacted on
November 29, 1990 as Sec. 153 of the Immigration Act of 1990, P.L. 101-649. On
December 12, 1991, additional legislation was enacted governing special immigrant
juveniles pursuant to the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization
Amendments of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-232, § 141, 83 Stat. 1733 (1991). On November 26,
1997, the SIJ provision was further amended by the Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998. Pub. L. No.
105-119 § 113, 111 Stat. 2440 (1998).
14. The other requirements for obtaining SIJ status are set forth at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27)(J) which defines a special immigrant juvenile as:
an immigrant who is present in the United States-
(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United
States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the
custody of, an agency or department of a State and who has been deemed eligible
by that court for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment;
(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings
that it would not be in the alien's best interest to be returned to the alien's or
parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence; and
(iii) in whose case the Attorney General expressly consents to the dependency
order serving as a precondition to the grant of special immigrant juvenile status;
except that-
(I) no juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the custody status or
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minor must be declared a "dependent" of a juvenile court,15 placed in
the care of a child welfare agency, and deemed eligible for long-term
foster care due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The minor is then
eligible to obtain an immigrant visa and apply for lawful permanent
residence. 6
Under the plain language of the SIJ statute, Gustavo was eligible
for SIJ relief. Yet the INS and the state juvenile dependency system
clashed over which government authority had the power to determine
his custody status and placement. The INS insisted it had absolute
authority over Gustavo. Before Gustavo could obtain the SIJ
protection, the INS took custody of him and refused to return him to
the child welfare system, even after a federal court ordered him
returned. 7
placement of an alien in the actual or constructive custody of the Attorney
General unless the Attorney General specifically consents to such jurisdiction;
and
(II) no natural parent or prior adoptive parent of any alien provided special
immigrant status under this subparagraph shall thereafter, by virtue of such
parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under this Act.
15. The SIJ statute specifies that the minor must "have been declared dependent on
a juvenile court" to be eligible for the SIJ status. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). The necessary
findings and orders must be made either by "that court," or, in the case of the best
interests determination regarding the minor's return to his or her home country, in
"administrative or judicial proceedings." Id. The federal regulations define "juvenile
court" as "a court located in the United States having jurisdiction under State law to make
judicial determinations about the custody and care of juveniles." 58 Fed. Reg. 154, 42850
(1993) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 2-4/11 (2000)).
In 1998 the INS issued a memorandum clarifying that minors in juvenile
delinquency proceedings may also be eligible under the SIJ statute. Interim Field
Guidance Relating to Public Law 105-19 (Sec. 113) amending Section 1101(a)(27)(J) of
the INA - Special Immigrant Juveniles, August 7, 1998, Thomas E. Cook, Acting
Assistant Commissioner, Adjudications Division, United States Department of Justice,
INS, at 3.
Depending on the state, a "family court," "probate court," or "district court" may
be vested with the authority to make the requisite orders for SIJ eligibility. See, e.g., Gao
v. Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming Michigan probate court's exercise
of jurisdiction over Gao and the determination that Gao was a dependent of the court);
Arteaga v. Texas Dep't. of Protective and Regulatory Serv., 924 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1996)
(noting that district court of Texas took jurisdiction over minor, declared her a "ward" of
the court, and thus enabled her to obtain SIJ status).
16. A lawful permanent resident has the right to live and work permanently in the
United States and to travel in and out of the country. Lawful permanent residents also
may receive authorization to seek employment in the United States and obtain limited
public benefits.
17. See Stipulation and Order Re: Compliance with Release Order of Immigration
Judge and Dismissal of Petition for Temporary Restraining Order, No. CV 98-5575 RAP,
(C.D. Cal. August 3, 1998) (ordering respondent INS to comply with order of immigration
judge issued on July 1,1998) (on file with the author).
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The INS's unwillingness to cede custody of Gustavo to the state
child welfare system arose, in part, from the federal government's
long-standing authority over the regulation of immigrants and the
INS's presumption that it has complete authority in this arena.
Indeed, courts have described the federal government's power over
immigration as "plenary" and "complete."' 8  State and local
governments, however, have historically taken principal responsibility
for protecting the health, safety, and welfare of children within their
territories, particularly those who have experienced family abuse,
neglect, and abandonment. 9 Focusing on the SIJ law, this article
explores precisely when, if ever, the federal government's power
yields to the states' power with regard to the treatment of
undocumented minors.
In Section I, this article discusses the cooperative state-federal
system established by the SIJ statute. This law diverges from
standard immigration policy by giving the responsibility for making
certain critical eligibility determinations in SIJ petitions to state
juvenile courts rather than the INS. In doing so, the SIJ statute takes
advantage of existing state and local child welfare systems that have
expertise and capacity to identify and address the needs of abused,
neglected, and abandoned children.
While the SIJ statute draws upon the strengths of both the
federal government and state child welfare institutions, it has also
created conflicts between state and federal systems, which are the
subject of Sections II and III. Section II describes the INS's
resistance to state courts and child welfare systems becoming
involved with children already detained in private or government
facilities contracted by the INS. Many of these children have
experienced family abuse, neglect, or abandonment and could be
released to state child welfare agencies and deemed eligible under the
SIJ statute. But the INS often retains custody over these children,
denying them the opportunity to obtain state child welfare services or
SIJ status, even though they may be eligible under federal law.
Section III describes the INS's practice of investigating the personal
lives of SIJ applicants, a practice that frustrates the SIJ statute's
18. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,305 (1993) ("Over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete.") (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792
(1977)).
19. This article does not take the position that there is something intrinsic about
states that requires them to bear the responsibility for child welfare matters, but argues
instead that states have historically taken that authority and responsibility.
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requirement that the INS rely upon state courts for factual eligibility
determinations regarding abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The
problems described in Sections II and III illustrate the challenges of
implementing a cooperative federal-state immigration program.
The remainder of this article focuses on a larger federal-state
conflict arising from the cooperative structure of the SIJ statute.
Sections IV and V explore whether the state or federal government
should have the power to determine the custody and placement status
of undocumented minors in the United States. Section IV examines
court cases in which undocumented children sought protection from a
state juvenile court after the INS already had obtained legal custody
over them. In these cases, the INS asserted that its custody over the
minor preempted a state court from exercising jurisdiction because
state court jurisdiction would interfere with or obstruct federalimmigration goals. While the specific holdings in these cases are no
longer important (Congress amended the SIJ statute in 1997), the
courts' analyses provide a valuable context for considering how state
and federal government entities might share responsibility and power
in the treatment of undocumented children. The article asks what
jurisdictional rule should govern when both a state court and the INS
have valid bases for exercising authority over an undocumented child.
Section V recounts how Congress answered this question. In
response to allegations of immigration fraud, Congress amended the
SIJ statute in 1997 and enacted a jurisdictional rule to govern state-
federal jurisdictional conflicts.' The amendments limit state court
power by removing state court jurisdiction over minors in INS
custody except in cases where the Attorney General consents to
jurisdiction. '  One consequence of the new jurisdictional rule,
however, is that it potentially jeopardizes the safety and lives of
undocumented children by limiting their access to vital protective
services.
Section V discusses alternative federal jurisdictional rules that
might achieve the same immigration fraud prevention goals that the
1997 law sought to accomplish without compromising the safety of
undocumented children. This article considers jurisdictional rules
that balance power between the federal government and states or, in
20. See supra note 14.
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) states "no juvenile court has jurisdiction to
determine the custody status or placement of an alien in the actual or constructive custody
of the Attorney General unless the Attorney General specifically consents to such
jurisdiction...."
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the alternative, favor greater state power over undocumented minors.
In addition, Congress should reevaluate the 1997 jurisdictional rule
because it may impose burdens on states that violate federalism
principles. Section VI explores the applicability of federalism
principles to immigration regulation and examines how a
jurisdictional rule could be crafted to avoid a federalism challenge.
I. The Special Immigrant Juvenile Statute
A. A System of State and Federal Cooperation
When Congress enacted the SIJ statute, it created a unique
administrative mechanism that requires the cooperation of state and
local child welfare systems, state juvenile courts and the INS. In all
SIJ cases, children must obtain the assistance of both the INS and the
state juvenile dependency system in order to obtain protection under
the statute. In this way, the SIJ statute reinforces the structure of the
child welfare system. The law vests power in state courts to make
important decisions regarding the minors' needs and requires that the
INS rely upon those state court decisions. However, by giving state
courts significant responsibility for determining minors' eligibility for
this immigration benefit without clearly defining the roles of the INS
and state courts in this process, Congress set the stage for conflict
between the federal government and state governments.
The enactment of the 1990 SIJ statute demonstrates Congress'
recognition that children who have experienced mistreatment in their
families deserve special protection and are extremely vulnerable as
children, immigrants, and survivors of family abuse, neglect, or
abandonment. The statute allows undocumented minors to seek the
protection of the juvenile dependency system and apply for lawful
immigration status. In many SIJ cases, adults bring children into the
country and continue to control and abuse them.' Often parents
have complete control over their child's immigration status (such as in
cases of family visa petitioning), and may threaten the minor with
deportation to prevent the minor from resisting and reporting the
abuse. 3 In other cases, such as that of Gustavo Sanchez,24 children
leave their families to escape abuse and neglect and enter the United
22. See, e.g., Arteaga, 924 S.W.2d 756 (describing Laura, a six-year-old undocumented
Mexican immigrant, who was subjected to severe and repeated physical abuse by her
immigrant parents, and eventually removed from the home and granted SI status).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (1999) (describing petitioning procedure for family members).
24. See supra text accompanying notes 12-18.
States alone. Once they arrive, they have no one to care for them and
the government child welfare system may be their only refuge. Like
the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which provides
relief to certain family members who are domestic violence survivors,
the SIJ statute represents Congress's goal of protecting
undocumented minors who have suffered family violence, abuse,
neglect, or abandonment.2'
Children who apply for SIJ status may be categorized into two
groups: those who enter the state juvenile dependency system prior to
any contact with the INS and those who are first detained by the INS
and later seek the protection of the dependency system. In practice,
most undocumented minors receive SIJ protection after they first
come to the attention of the child welfare system based on a child
abuse report filed by police, social workers, or other concerned
persons. If the child welfare system and the state juvenile court
conclude that the minor requires government protection, the court
may declare the minor a dependent of the court. Under the
protection of the child welfare system, the minor can receive shelter,
food, clothing, medical care, mental health counseling, and other
services. After the state court has made the requisite findings, the
minor is eligible to apply to the federal INS for the SIJ immigration
benefit.2 The INS generally does not object to state court and child
welfare agency involvement in cases where children enter the
dependency system prior to INS contact.'
Those minors whom the INS first detains are also eligible for SIJ
protection, but under much more limited conditions.' Pursuant to
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I), (a)(1)(A)(iv)(I), and (a)(1)(B)(iii) (setting forth
VAWA self-petitioning requirements for spouses and children).
26. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2000).
27. In some cases, such as Gustavo Sanchez's, the INS has objected to state custody of
children even though the state juvenile court had exercised jurisdiction and declared the
child a dependent of the court. See supra text accompanying notes 12-18.
Minors who first become the subject of a juvenile delinquency petition because
they are arrested for a crime or delinquent act, may have difficulty entering the juvenile
dependency system and obtaining SIJ protection. In some states, such as California,
minors who are the subject of a delinquency petition may be placed in the dependency
system instead, if they are identified as having experienced abuse, neglect or
abandonment. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 241.1 (West Supp. 2000)(setting
forth requirement that minors who "appearj]" to belong within both the dependency and
delinquency systems be evaluated and placed in only one of the two systems). While the
SIJ statute presents no bar to such minors obtaining SIJ status, in practice, they are less
likely to be classified as juvenile court dependents and obtain SIJ status.
28. See infra Sections II and V (describing, respectively, INS treatment of detained
minors and the 1997 statutory amendments which set forth new rules for how minors in
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amendments passed in 1997, state juvenile courts no longer have
jurisdiction over minors in INS "actual or constructive custody"
unless the Attorney General consents to state court jurisdiction.29 As
of September 2000, the INS had not promulgated regulations defining
how minors in the Attorney General's "actual or constructive
custody" should apply for SIJ protection.' A 1999 INS policy
memorandum stated that requests for the Attorney General's consent
must be sent in writing to the local INS district director and that
consent must be obtained before any state court proceedings are
begun.31 If these requirements are not met, the state court order is
deemed invalid. 2 In practice, minors in INS detention are unlikely to
be screened for abuse, neglect, or abandonmen 3 and may not be
granted permission to enter the juvenile dependency system.'
Moreover, current INS policy does not explain how minors whom the
INS detention may obtain SIT status).
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I).
30. See infra Section V (Regional practices differ in their procedures for granting SIJ
applications to minors in the Attorney General's "actual or constructive" custody. Most
require that the petitioning minor obtain written consent from the INS local district
director before taking any action in state court. A search of the Federal Register yielded
no regulations interpreting the 1997 SIT amendment).
The 1997 amendments to the SIJ statute does not define "actual or constructive
custody." As of June 2000, the INS had not yet promulgated federal regulations clarifying
the meaning of this term. A July 1999 policy memorandum issued by the INS did not
provide further clarification of this term. See Special Immigrant Juveniles-Memorandum
#2: Clarification of Interim Field Guidance, July 9, 1999, Thomas E. Cook, Acting
Assistant Commissioner, Adjudications Division, United States Department of Justice,
INS.
31. See Memorandum from Thomas E. Cook, Acting Assistant Commissioner,
Adjudication Division, U.S. Department of Justice, INS on Special Immigrant Juveniles -
Memorandum # 2: Clarification Guidance (July 9, 1999)(on file with author)
32. Id.
33. See infra Section II (describing INS's lack of screening protocols for minors in INS
detention).
34. Interview with Christina Kleiser, Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center (Feb. 14,
2000). AJ.A. is an example of a minor whom the INS denied the opportunity to seek
juvenile court protection because he was in INS custody. His father was murdered in
1996, and his mother and two younger siblings disappeared when war broke out in
Somalia. Efforts by government and international agencies failed to locate those family
members, and they are presumed dead. At the time he was detained by the INS he had no
family that could provide a safe and stable home for him in either the United States or
Somalia. When he sought the consent of the Attorney General to seek the juvenile court's
protection, the INS denied his request. A local officer stated that the SIJ statute was not
intended to assist "arriving aliens" (such as those arriving into airports), though the SIT
statute expressly states that they are eligible for SIT protection. The INS placed a high
burden on the minor to prove to the INS, rather than a state juvenile court, that he had
been abused, neglected or abandoned. Id.
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INS releases into foster care or the care of family or other adult
caregivers should apply for SIJ status.
B. The INS's Dependence on State Juvenile Courts in SIJ Cases
The different treatment accorded to INS-detained minors
illustrates the tension the SIJ statute created by requiring the INS to
cooperate with and depend upon state juvenile courts. Historically,
the INS has borne primary responsibility for verifying the underlying
facts supporting an immigrant's petition for relief. 5 For example, an
asylum applicant who alleges political persecution may attest to the
torture she experienced and submit documents demonstrating her
"well-founded fear" of persecution. 6 The INS verifies the credibility
of her statements and the strength of supporting evidence and, in
doing so, may cross-examine the asylum applicant and ask her to
submit additional materials. The asylum law states that the Attorney
General will "determine" that the applicant qualifies as a refugee. 7
The law also includes, in the definition of refugee, particular elements
that the applicant must establish to the INS, such as a "well-founded
fear" of persecution on account of race, political opinion, or other
grounds."8
Congress also granted broad authority to the INS to evaluate the
factual veracity of petitions under the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), which enables certain spouses and children who have
experienced family violence to petition for legal immigration status
without the cooperation of the battering spouse or parent.39 Under
VAWA a child or spouse petitioner must demonstrate that he or she
has been "battered by or has been the subject of extreme cruelty
35. See Peter Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and
Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 430 (1999) ("[Tjhe federal
government possesses exclusive legal authority over immigration and has delegated all of
that authority to one agency, the INS.").
36. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1999) (setting forth "well-founded fear" basis for
definition of "refugee").
37. See 8 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1) (1999).
38. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
39. See 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv), (a)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii) (1999). VAWA enables
spouses and children, who have experienced domestic violence at the hands of a spouse or
parent who is a lawful permanent resident or a U.S. citizen, to petition on their own and
obtain lawful permanent resident status. VAWA provides two avenues for relief: 1)
domestic violence survivors who are not in removal proceedings may "self-petition" for
relief; and 2) domestic violence survivors who are in removal proceedings may apply for
"cancellation of removal."
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perpetrated" by the spouse or parent.' VAWA further requires that
the immigrant applicant "demonstrate[] to the Attorney General"
that such battery or extreme cruelty occurred.4' Thus VAWA
specifically requires that the Attorney General or her designee, the
INS, verify the existence of domestic abuse. VAWA self-petitioners
often submit state court orders, such as restraining orders, as evidence
of the abusive relationship. 42 The state court documents, however,
only serve as proof of the abuse and are not conclusive evidence of
abuse for VAWA purposes.43 VAWA, like asylum law, requires that
the applicant demonstrate to the INS each requisite statutory
element, and the INS is the sole adjudicator of the petition.
By contrast, the SIJ statute limits the INS role to the verification
of only certain information and specifically states that the INS will
rely upon state juvenile courts' findings of the history of abuse,
neglect, or abandonment, and the minor's best interests.44 The SIJ
statute defines a special immigrant juvenile as a minor who "has been
declared a dependent of a juvenile court" and who has been "deemed
eligible by that court for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect or
abandonment., 4' The statute does not define a special immigrant
juvenile as a minor who is or has been abused, neglected, or
abandoned. In this way, the SIJ statute is unique because it
conditions the receipt of the substantive immigration benefit upon a
state court order. Unlike asylum law or VAWA, which require proof
of "well-founded fear" or battery or extreme cruelty, the SIJ statute
does not require the INS to make independent findings that the
minor experienced abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The official
comments to the 1993 SIJ regulations support this interpretation of
40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I), (A)(iv)(I), and (B)(iii).
41. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv) and (B)(iii).
42. See 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(2)(iv) (2000):
Evidence of abuse may include, but is not limited to, reports and affidavits from
police, judges and other court officials, medical personnel, school officials, clergy,
social workers, and other social service agency personnel. Persons who have
obtained an order of protection against the abuser or have taken other legal steps
to end the abuse are strongly encouraged to submit copies of the relating legal
documents. Evidence that the abuse victim sought safe-haven in a battered
women's shelter or similar refuge may be relevant, as may a combination of
documents such as a photograph of the visibly injured self-petitioner supported
by affidavits. Other forms of credible relevant evidence will also be considered.
43. VAWA does not require self-petitioners to submit restraining orders as proof of
domestic abuse. Other forms of evidence, including police reports, medical reports,
photographs of injured victims, and the petitioner's declaration can be submitted as proof.
44. See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J)(i)-(ii) (1999).
45. See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (1999) (emphasis added).
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the statute: "The final [regulations] state[] that the decision
concerning the best interests of the child may only be made by the
juvenile court."'
Furthermore, the express language of the statute directs the INS
to rely upon the order of the state juvenile court, not the underlying
factual premises that support the order.' While VAWA requires that
the history of domestic abuse be shown, the SIJ statute limits the
Attorney General's role to "consent[ing]" to "the dependency order
serving as a precondition" to SIJ status.' As described by the Sixth
Circuit in Gao v. Jenifer, "the [Immigration and Nationality Act]
specifically delegates determinations of dependency, eligibility for
long-term foster care and the best interests of the child to state
juvenile courts." 9 Thus, the SIJ statute does not authorize federal
agency review of the state court determinations. Indeed, the state
court's order is the substantive requirement for the immigration
benefit.
C. The States' Predominance over Child Welfare Matters
The reliance upon state juvenile courts anticipated in the SIJ
statutory scheme signals Congress' recognition that the states retain
primary responsibility and administrative competency to protect child
welfare. Although Congress has enacted major legislation setting
regulatory standards for state and local child welfare programs,' the
46. See Special Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a Juvenile
Court, Final Rule, Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Supplementary Information, 58 Fed. Reg. 154, 42843 (1993) (codified at 8 C.F.R. Pts. 101,
103, 204, 205 & 245) [hereinafter Special Immigrant Status]. The comments also state that
the INS "believes it would be both impractical and inappropriate for the [INS] to routinely
readjudicate judicial or social service agency administrative determinations as to the
juvenile's best interest." Id.
47. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i).
48. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii).
49. 185 F.3d 548,555.
50. For examples of major federal provisions regulating child welfare matters see
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(1997); Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), Pub. L. No. 96-
272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679 (1994); Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act of 1974 (CAPTA) Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. (Supp. II 1996)); Indian Child Welfare Act (setting
forth procedural standards regarding treatment and care of Native American children in
the child welfare system). Congress has also established standards for the treatment of
juvenile "status offenders," youth who are charged with or who have committed acts that
would not be criminal if committed by an adult, such as running away, violating curfew, or
being found uncontrollable. See e.g., Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act of
1974,42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5777, Pub. L. No. 96- 509 (as amended 1980).
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principal federal regulatory method has been to offer federal funding
incentives to encourage state participation and compliance with
national child welfare standards. 1 All fifty states have created
administrative and judicial systems to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of children.
Consequently, administrative and judicial expertise in child
welfare matters resides primarily with the states and local
governments. State and local agencies employ caseworkers to
investigate allegations of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.
Psychologists, educators, and other professionals are frequently
summoned to evaluate children and provide services. State and local
agencies also license and manage foster-homes, group-homes, and
larger facilities that provide for the daily care of children in the
dependency system. Finally, the states' judicial branch plays a critical
role in the management and oversight of the child welfare system.
For example, in California, whenever a child is removed from
parental custody without parental consent, a juvenile court must
make specific findings that placement with the family is contrary to
the child's welfare. Juvenile courts must also find that the child
welfare agency made "reasonable efforts" to enable the child to
remain in the home or to reunify the family if removal has occurred. 3
51. See, e.g. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) (discussing how
CAPTA used financial incentives to create federal standards in several areas of child
welfare, including investigatory methods, confidentiality of records, and provision of legal
counsel); Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) (employing financial
incentives to encourage state participation, AACWA established uniform guidelines
requiring state child welfare systems to create reunification plans for families, to make
"reasonable efforts" at reunification, and to comply with other standards. 42 U.S.C. §
671(a)); Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) (maintaining the federal funding
incentive structure established in CAPTA and AACWA and establishing new standards
for state child welfare systems. Significantly, ASFA clarified under what circumstances
states are required to make "reasonable efforts" to reunify a family. See 42 U.S.C. §
671(a)(15)(D)).
52. See Carol S. Stevenson, Lucy S. Carter et. al., The Juvenile Court: Analysis and
Recommendations, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Vol. 6, No. 3, Winter 1996, at 16. See,
e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 319 (grounds for continued detention) and § 361
(grounds for removal) (under § 319, one basis upon which a court may order child to be
detained in custody is if a prima facie showing has been made that "there is a substantial
danger to the physical health of the minor or the minor is suffering severe emotional
damage, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical or emotional
health may be protected with removing the minor from the parents' or guardians' physical
custody." Other grounds include showing of flight risk by parents, that the minor has left
a placement made by the juvenile court, or that the minor is unwilling to return home due
to physical or sexual abuse by someone residing in the home.).
53. See Stevenson, supra note 52, at 16. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 306(b)
(defining what types of services, public assistance, or other accommodations can be made
To enable a child to remain in the family's custody, caseworkers often
provide counseling, child care, parenting assistance classes, and other
supportive services to the famly.' The child welfare system may also
offer cash aid, transportation vouchers, and other public assistance.
Finally, in order to make decisions regarding the child's best interests,
a juvenile court regularly monitors the case and holds periodic
hearings.5 Thus, state juvenile courts must engage in a rigorous fact-
finding process before declaring a child dependent.
The federal government's more limited regulatory role in child
welfare has resulted in comparatively less operational capacity in
dealing with individual child welfare cases. The federal government
lacks the professional staff and administrative support to make
assessments of individual children's mental and physical conditions
and their welfare needs. Furthermore, within the judicial branch,
federal courts have more limited jurisdiction over such matters. 56 As
a result, state courts have developed greater competency for
administration of child welfare matters.
In offering this comparison of the federal and state roles in
addressing child welfare matters, this article does not argue that the
existing division of roles is the way child welfare matters ought to be
handled. While some commentators have argued that there are
intrinsic benefits to delegating matters pertaining to families and
children to a particular branch of government, it is not the purpose of
this article to advance such a theory. Many state child welfare
systems provide adequate care for children, but state systems are not
a panacea for abused, neglected, or abandoned children. Many
to enable child to remain in custody of parent, guardian or caretaker).
54. See e.g., CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 306,319 and 366.
55. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366(a) ("The status of every dependent
child in foster care shall be reviewed periodically... no less frequently than once every six
months.").
56. See, e.g., Room for Improvement, CHILD LAW PRACTICE, Vol. 18, No. 12, at 192
(quoting speech given by Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor at the National
Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System, May 1999) ("For
judges, family cases present special challenges because their role in such cases is
substantially different from those in criminal and civil courts.").
57. Federal courts have noted that the subject of "domestic relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the law of the United
States." In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890).
58. In 1996 child welfare agencies in 21 states and the District of Columbia were
under court supervision due to systemic deficiencies that placed the safety and care of
children at risk. Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of
Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 79, 121 (1997) (citing David
Stoesz & Howard Jacob Karger, Suffer the Children: How Government Fails its Most
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states might even benefit from an increased or more hands-on federal
presence to ensure that children are properly protected. At the
moment, however, the federal government has not taken
responsibility for the direct administration of child welfare programs,
and states currently have more systems in place to handle child
welfare matters.
The cooperative structure of the SIJ statute removes from the
INS the responsibility for making determinations of a child's "best
interest," a task the INS could not effectively perform because of its
conflicting interest in restricting immigration into the United States.
The INS's primary mission and functions are to enforce immigration
law, monitor United States borders and ports of entry, and remove
individuals who do not have lawful immigration status." The role of
the INS is that of a gatekeeper, not a disinterested party concerned
with assessing the needs of children. These functions place the
agency in an adversarial relationship with respect to all child
applicants for SIJ status. The INS cannot serve as both an adversary
and a neutral adjudicator of a child's "best interest." By contrast,
state juvenile courts and child welfare systems are specifically
designed to identify a child's interests and to provide for his or her
needs. In this regard, state juvenile courts are more neutral
government entities and are better equipped to make "best interest"
determinations for children.
Even the INS has acknowledged its limited experience in this
area:
The Service does not intend to make determinations in the
course of deportation proceedings regarding the 'best interest'
of a child for the purpose of establishing eligibility for special
immigrant juvenile classification.... It would be both
impractical and inappropriate for the Service to routinely
readjudicate judicial or social service agency administrative
Vulnerable Citizens-Abused and Neglected Kids, WASH. MONTHLY, June 1996, at 20.
59. See Strategic Plan, Toward INS 2000: Accepting the Challenge, U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, Office of Policy and Planning (approved by Commissioner
Doris Meissner, November 2, 1994) at 4 (describing INS mission). The INS website lists
four principal functions for the agency:
Conducts immigration inspections of travelers entering (or seeking entry) to the
United States.... Regulates permanent and temporary immigration to the
United States. ... Maintains control of U.S. borders. . .. Identifies and removes
people who have no lawful immigration status in the United States. The INS also
works with other Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to uphold
the laws of the United States.
<http:lwww.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/insmissionlindex.htm>.
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determinations as to the juvenile's best interest."'
The legislative history to the 1997 statutory amendments states that
"the involvement of the Attorney General is for the purpose of
determining special immigrant juvenile status and not for making
determinations of dependency status.""
As a matter of federal and state power, the SIJ statute strikes a
balance that relies upon existing state systems to handle child welfare
matters while at the same time requiring the INS to perform its
function of regulating immigration. By making use of state child
welfare systems, the SIJ statute avoided the need to create an
additional INS program to assess and provide for the needs of
children who have been abused, neglected, and abandoned. The SIJ
statute's adjudicatory scheme, however, presents a number of
challenges that flow directly from the required cooperation between
federal and state entities. Sections II and HI examine problems that
have arisen in the implementation of the SIJ statute.
H. The Treatment of Children in INS Custody
A. The Exclusion of INS-Detained Children from SIJ Status
Since the SIJ program came into effect, the INS has frequently
denied child welfare protection to minors who are in INS legal
custody, despite the fact that they could be eligible for SIJ relief.
Even if these minors are physically located within a state's territory,
state and local child welfare agencies have been unable to shelter or
protect them after the INS asserts custody.62 Furthermore, the 1997
SI1 amendments limited state court jurisdiction over minors in INS
legal custody and, consequently, made it even more difficult for state
child welfare agencies to assist children in such cases.' As a result,
minors who have suffered abuse, neglect, or abandonment often
remain in INS detention or are returned to their country of origin
without any opportunity to apply for SIJ status. Those children who
remain in the United States may be confined in substandard,
sometimes inhumane, facilities that do not provide proper care or
60. See Special Immigrant Status, supra note 46.
61. Conference Comm. Report of the Dep't of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113,
11 Stat. 2440 (1997) (Report on file with the author).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 71-76.
63. See supra note 21; see also infra Sections IV & V.
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services.'
This problem is created in part by the resistance of the INS to
state and local involvement. Unaccustomed to sharing responsibility
for adjudicating immigration decisions, the INS regularly obstructs
state involvement with minors in INS legal custody. Despite the
states' greater competency in child welfare matters and the SIJ
statute's call for state-federal cooperation, minors in INS custody
frequently do not benefit from state assistance. The consequences
can be grave for children who have suffered abuse, neglect, or
abandonment and need the protection of state and local child welfare
agencies.
Although statistics showing the number of minors in INS legal
custody who have experienced family abuse, neglect, and
abandonment are not available,6' interviews with immigration
practitioners reveal that many detained children have suffered severe
abuse, neglect, or abandonment. One practitioner described seven
minors held in an INS contracted facility in Texas who were abused,
neglected, or abandoned, but were not able to seek SIJ visas because
their removal proceedings were expedited, as is the case for most
detained minors.' Another Texas practitioner described four
64. See infra text accompanying notes 77-105.
65. Pursuant to the settlement agreement reached in Flores v. Reno, the INS is
mandated to provide statistics regarding minors detained in INS custody for longer than
72 hours, including basic biographic information, dates of custody, placement, removal,
and release, immigration status, and hearing dates. See Flores v. Reno, CV 85-4544-RJK
16, 17 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1996) (concerning a settlement agreement signed by INS
Commissioner Doris Messner) (on file with author) (hereinafter Flores Settlement
Agreement). These statistics do not document the minors' experiences of abuse, neglect or
abandonment. Id Human Rights Watch has compiled and published two reports on INS
conditions of confinement of juveniles: SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS:
UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN DETAINED BY THE U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE (1997) [hereinafter SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS] and
Detained and Deprived of Rights: Children in the Custody of the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Dec. 1998 [hereinafter Detained and Deprived].
66. Interview with Steven Lang of the South Texas Pro Bono Asylum Project,
Harlingen, TX (Feb. 1, 2000) (Jose Enrique and Jose Luis were fourteen-year-old twins
from Honduras whose family had physically abused them, forced them to sleep outdoors,
and finally abandoned them. Another boy from Honduras (name withheld) was an
illegitimate child who never knew the identity of his real father. He was beaten horribly
by his stepfather, denied schooling, and eventually turned out of the house when his
mother died. The fourth child was a sixteen-year-old from Honduras named Oscar whose
parents were dead and who had lived on the streets on his own for more than ten years.
The fifth was an eleven-year-old from Honduras (name withheld) whose mother was dead
and stepfather forced him out of his home. The last two were two sixteen year old boys
from El Salvador who had lost contact with their families as children and who had suffered
terrible abuse while living on the streets. Each of these children would have had strong
siblings, the youngest of whom had been sexually assaulted, whose
parents' whereabouts were unknown and could not be traced.67 Other
practitioners in Philadelphia and Miami offered similar accounts of
children in INS detention in need of child welfare services.' These
examples, though selective, demonstrate that many minors in INS
detention have experienced family abuse, neglect, or abandonment
and require more specialized services and care.
If the INS detains a minor who has suffered abuse, neglect, or
abandonment, the minor is entitled to the protections afforded under
the SIJ statute regardless of the manner of entry into the United
States. In 1993, Congress, in an effort to ensure protection for minors
experiencing family violence, added amendments to the SIJ statute,
creating waivers for SIJ applicants from many of the standard bars to
obtaining lawful permanent resident status. 9  Notably, a minor's
cases for entering the juvenile dependency system if they had been giving the opportunity
to do so.).
67. See Interview with Lynn Coyle, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
of Texas, El Paso, TX (Jan. 26, 2000) (discussing that four children, three girls and one
boy, ages 14 and younger, were from Honduras. Because of the children's traumatic
experiences, the INS placed the children with a local church which assisted the children in
obtaining child welfare services.).
68. Interview with advocate in Philadelphia, PA (name confidential) (Feb. 2, 2000)
(Describing the experience of a twelve-year old boy from Jamaica who had been detained
by the INS. The boy witnessed the mother and father use hatchets and knives against each
other. His brother was involved in drug-related activity. He ran away from home several
times.). See also Interview with Christina Kleiser, Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center,
Miami, FL. (Feb. 14, 2000) (describing a seventeen-year-old boy from Somalia whose
mother disappeared when he was eight years-old. His father was murdered in 1996.
Neither parent or other family arranged for his care or custody, and he survived alone on
the streets for approximately 4 years. Under Florida law the boy qualified as an orphan
and abandoned child. He was detained by the INS and was not given an opportunity to
apply for
protection from the juvenile dependency system before being removed from the United
States.).
69. For example, special immigrant juveniles were given automatic waivers from the
public charge ground and some documentation grounds of inadmissibility and
discretionary waivers for almost all other grounds for inadmissibility. See 8 U.S.C. §
1255(h). Other categories of immigrants have access to only limited waivers for certain
grounds that often require a showing of extreme hardship to family members who are
United States citizens or lawful permanent residents. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h), which
states:
(h) Application with respect to special immigrants. In applying this section to a
special immigrant described in section 101(a)(27)(J) [8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27)(J)]-
(1) such an immigrant shall be deemed, for purposes of subsection (a), to
have been paroled into the United States; and
(2) in determining the alien's admissibility as an immigrant-
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illegal entry would not bar him from obtaining SIJ status and
adjusting status to permanent residency.' The regulations state that
the purpose of the SU statute is to protect minors who may have been
abused, neglected, or abandoned "regardless of their method of
entry."'" Generally, a border entry without INS inspection constitutes
grounds for "inadmissibility" or "removal" and can result in
removal." By comparison, the 1993 amendments classifies minors,
who were brought illegally into the U.S. by their parents or who
illegally entered the country on their own, as having been "paroled
in."" Under this classification, the minor remains eligible for SIJ
status and lawful permanent residence. In waiving this bar,
Congress has demonstrated special solicitude for abused, neglected,
and abandoned minors. The INS expressed particular concern that
federal procedures not delay child welfare actions "urgently needed
to ensure proper care for dependent children."'75
Contrary to the 1993 amendments and its own regulations, the
INS has excluded minors in INS detention from receiving child
welfare protection and from applying for SIJ status. In 1995, the INS
(A) paragraphs (4), (5)(A), and (7)(A) of section 212(a) [8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)] shall not apply, and
(B) the Attorney General may waive other paragraphs of section
212(a) [8 U.S.C.S. § 1182(a)] (other than paragraphs (2)(A), (2)(B),
(2)(C) (except for so much of such paragraph as related to a single
offense of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana), (3)(A),
(3)(B), (3)(C), and (3)(E)) in the case of individual aliens for
humanitarian purposes, family unity, or when it is otherwise in the
public interest.
The relationship between an alien and the alien's natural parents or
prior adoptive parents shall not be considered a factor in making a
waiver under paragraph (2)(B). Nothing in this subsection or section
101(a)(27)(J) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)] shall be construed as
authorizing an alien to apply for admission or be admitted to the United
States in order to obtain special immigrant status described in such
section.
70. Id.
71. The newly-added subsection 125(h) "permits most special immigrant juveniles to
become lawful permanent residents regardless of the method of original entry into the
United States, unauthorized employment, or failure to maintain lawful nonimmigrant
status." Special Immigrant Status, supra note 46.
72. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (defining grounds of "inadmissibility," formerly referred to as
"exclusion"); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (defining grounds of "removal" formerly referred to as
"deportation.")
73. Such minors are deemed "paroled" into the United States and therefore are
eligible to adjust their status to lawful permanent resident without undergoing consular
processing which requires a departure from the country. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h).
74. Id.
75. Special Immigrant Status, supra note 46.
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announced a policy excluding detained juveniles from SIJ relief.76
The INS reiterated that policy in 1996, stating that "[a]liens who are
in INS custody are not eligible for special immigrant juvenile status."
Anecdotal accounts from practitioners indicate that the INS remains
recalcitrant despite congressional amendments passed in 1997 which
clarified that minors in INS actual or constructive custody may seek
juvenile court protection and apply for SIJ protection, provided that
the Attorney General consents.78 A 1999 INS policy memorandum
stated that consent "should" be granted if "it appears that the
juvenile would be eligible for SI status if a dependency order is
issued" and "the dependency proceeding would be in the best
interests of the juvenile."79
Despite these policy statements, in 1999 an INS official in
Pennsylvania stated to an advocate that he could not foresee any
minors in detention at the main facility in that region becoming
eligible for parole for SIJ purposes.' In February 2000, an advocate
seeking Attorney General consent for a client was told that SIJ status
was not intended to protect arriving aliens, such as minors who had
arrived at an airport without documentation, who were detained by
the INS. These policies contravene the express purpose of the SIJ
statute to protect all undocumented minors, even those detained for
entering the U.S. illegally.
Another problem with the INS policy regarding detained minors
is its failure to provide counseling and other services to minors who
are abused, neglected, or abandoned. Pursuant to the 1996
settlement agreement in Flores v. Reno,' which governs INS
detention practice nationwide, minors who have "suffered serious
neglect or abuse" and require special services or treatment as a result
76. INS Legal Opinion: Foster Care Detention of Unaccompanied Juvenile Aliens,
June 30, 1995.
77. INS Legal Opinion: Special Immigrant Juveniles, New Orleans, April 23, 1996, at
1.
78. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113 (1997).
79. See Cook, supra note 31.
80. Interview with Cherylle Corpuz, Nationalities Services Center, Philadelphia, PA
(Jan. 10, 2000) (statement attributed to Ted Nordmark, Assistant Director for Detention
and Deportation, INS regarding the Berks County Youth Center, Pennsylvania).
81. Interview with Christina Kleiser, Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, Miami, FL
(Feb. 14,2000).
82. 507 U.S. at 295.
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of the abuse are entitled to receive services.' The agreement
mandates that the INS "assess minors" to determine if they have
suffered serious abuse, neglect, or abandonment.' In practice,
however, many INS-contracted facilities do not screen minors for
family trauma.' Some facilities do not even have appropriate
bilingual staff for monolingual children.' Many facilities do not
provide therapeutic or counseling services to minors who have
suffered abuse, neglect, or abandonment.' The poor treatment of
many children in INS-contracted facilities is compounded by its
frequent use of higher security detention for immigrant minors.
B. INS's Use of Secure Detention Facilities for Immigrant Children
In 1999, the INS placed nearly 2000 minors in higher security jail-
like facilities,' even though 78% of these minors were not chargeable
with any offense, had not been adjudicated delinquent, and had not
83. Flores Settlement Agreement, supra note 65, at 5.
84. Id.
85. Interviews with several local practitioners indicate that the following facilities do
not screen juvenile detainees for family abuse, neglect or abandonment: Los Angeles
County Juvenile Hall, CA; Berks County Youth Center, PA; Liberty County Juvenile
Detention Facility, TX; and Yuma County Juvenile Detention Center, CA. Interviews
with Steven Lang, South Texas Pro Bono Asylum Project, Harlingen, TX (Feb. 1, 2000);
advocate in Philadelphia (name confidential) (Feb. 2, 2000); Vibiana Andrade, Mexican
American Legal Defense Fund, Los Angeles, CA (Jan. 21, 2000); Wendy Young,
Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children (Jan. 11, 2000); and Vanessa
Melendez Lucas, Children and Family Justice Center, Northwestern Law School (Jan. 10,
2000).
86. Interviews with local practitioners indicate that the following facilities do not have
bilingual staff for many of the non-English speaking minors detained in the facilities:
Yuma County Juvenile Detention Center, CA; Central Juvenile Hall, Los Angeles, CA;
and Los Padrinos Juvenile Detention Center, CA. Interviews with Wendy Young and
Denise Baez, Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC), Los Angeles, CA (Jan. 13,
2000). See also SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS, supra note 65, at 49.
87. Local practitioners have stated that the Heartland Alliance facility in Chicago, the
Southwest Key facility in Coolidge, Arizona, and the Catholic Charities Boystown in
Miami offer counseling and mental health services. Interviews with Christoph Erhhardt,
Midwest Immigrant Refugee Center, Chicago, IL (Jan. 10, 200); Christopher Nugent,
Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project, AZ (Jan. 13, 2000); and Liliana
Avedano, Boystown, FL. (Feb. 2,2000). State-operated juvenile halls such as Los Angeles
Central Juvenile Hall, Liberty County Juvenile Detention Center, Texas, Berks County
Youth Center, and Yuma County Juvenile Detention Center generally do not provide
such services. See SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS, supra note 65, at 50.
88. Examples of higher security detention facilities are the Berks County Youth
Center, PA; Los Angeles Central Juvenile Hall, Los Padrinos Juvenile Detention Center,
CA; and the Yuma County Juvenile Detention Center, CA. SLIPPING THROUGH THE
CRACKS, supra note 65, at 50.
exhibited any disruptive, threatening, or violent behavior. That
year, 63% of the higher security detentions were for more than 72
hours.' Most of the higher security facilities are state or local
juvenile halls where immigrant minors share living space with non-
INS detained minors charged with delinquent acts or who have
already been adjudicated delinquent. Generally, local juvenile hall
facilities use more severe and punitive methods to control the
delinquent youth population. Such facilities are inappropriate for
immigrant children who may not speak English and may have
experienced severe family abuse or other violence or trauma.
Under the Flores agreement, only minors who are flight risks, are
chargeable or charged with or convicted of certain delinquent acts,
have exhibited violent or disruptive behavior, or require secured
detention for their own safety can be placed in secured facilities. 9"
However, minors whose offense or chargeable offense is a petty
offense or an isolated, non-violent, and non-weapon-related offense,
may not be placed in higher security detention.' According to one
practitioner, in 1999 the Berks County facility in Pennsylvania
directly violated this rule by placing minors charged with petty
offenses, such as shoplifting, in high security detention.' Since then,
the facility may have reduced this practice.94
89. Flores Settlement Agreement, supra note 65, at 12-13. In 1998 and 1999,
approximately one third of all children detained by the INS were held in higher security
facilities. Jo Becker, Children in Detention Suffer Denial of Basic Human Rights,
DETENTION WATCH NETWORK NEWS, Apr./May 2000, at 4 (citing INS statistics which
indicate that in 1999 federal fiscal year 34% of juvenile detention stays, nearly 2,000
children, were in secure facilities.). See Detained and Deprived of Rights supra note 65.
90. Becker, supra note 89, at 4.
91. See Flores Settlement Agreement, supra note 65, at 12-13.
92. The settlement agreement states that secure detention shall not apply to any
minor whose offense(s) fall(s) within the following categories:
Isolated offenses that (1) were not within a pattern or practice of criminal activity
and (2) did not involve violence against a person or the use or carrying of a
weapon (Examples: breaking and entering, vandalism, DUI, etc. This list is not
exhaustive.);
Petty offenses, which are not considered grounds for stricter means of detention
in any case (Examples: shoplifting, joy riding, disturbing the peace, etc. This list
is not exhaustive.)
Id. at 13.
93. Interview with advocate (name confidential), Philadelphia, PA (Feb. 2, 2000).
The Flores agreement does not allow secured detention for minors charged with,
chargeable, or convicted of, petty offenses and provides specific examples of shoplifting,
joy riding, or disturbing the peace. Flores Settlement Agreement, supra note 65, at 13.
94. Electronic mail communication with advocate (name confidential) in
Philadelphia, PA (June 22,2000).
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Another problem is the INS's excessive placement of minors in
high security facilities when there is insufficient space in appropriate
placements.95 Even though the Flores agreement allows minors to be
placed in secure facilities when there is an "emergency influx" of
minors into the country, 1999 INS statistics indicate that 44% of all
secure placements made during that year, a total of 855 placements,
were for reasons of overflowY In effect, the INS regularly justifies
the placement of children in secured detention due to its lack of
proper facilities, despite the fact that these children present no other
risk.98 As early as 1985, when the Flores v. Reno litigation first began,
advocates have been calling for the INS to provide adequate facilities
for the detainment of children. Thus, the INS has continued to claim
that there are "emergency" influxes of minors even though it has had
many years to build adequate facilities or to contract with existing
facilities to accommodate immigrant children.
Specific cases further demonstrate the serious problems with the
INS policy of using high security detention facilities for immigrant
children. For example, in one facility the INS detained four Pakistani
children in high security detention for four months even though each
child had a close relative with guardianship papers that was willing to
take custody.' In 1999, the INS placed six Chinese children in a
juvenile detention center in Portland, Oregon."° One of the children,
a fifteen-year-old girl, was held for several weeks despite the fact that
she had been granted asylum and her uncle living in New York was
prepared to care for her."' The young girl's release into foster care
and the transfer of three of the Chinese boys in the Oregon facility to
95. Flores Settlement Agreement supra note 65, at 13-14.
96. Id. at 8-9.
97. INS Juvenile Detention and Shelter Program Statistics, FY 1999, as cited in
Becker, supra note 89.
98. SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS, supra note 65; Jo Becker, The Other
Immigrant Children, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 7, 2000. The Central Juvenile Hall in Los
Angeles frequently operates at an "emergency influx" status, and is therefore holding kids
who do not present a flight risk or danger to other children with other youthful offenders.
See SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS supra note 65, at 46; Interview with Denise Baez,
Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC), Los Angeles, CA (Jan. 12,2000).
99. See Detained and Deprived, supra note 65.
100. See Smith Secures Promise of Temporary Foster Care for 15-year-old from INS
Commissioner Meissner, Congressional Press Releases, (December 16, 1999). In the
Portland facility, the average length of stay for detained minors was 38 days during the
1996-97 calendar year. Id
101. Smith Secures Promise of Temporary Foster Care for 15-year-old from INS
Commissioner Meissner, supra note 100.
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more appropriate shelter-care was secured only after advocates drew
substantial public attention to the inhumane conditions of the
children's confinement and obtained the assistance of an Oregon
Senator to place pressure on the INS."°
Conditions in some secure facilities are grossly inhumane. 3
Minors in the Los Angeles facility report that staff have used pepper
spray against them and have employed severe methods of control,
such as limiting use of the bathroom and forbidding detainees from
turning their heads as they walk down the hallway."° As of early
2000, the Berks County facility used handcuffs and ankle shackles in
the facility and to transport minors to and from immigration court. 5
In 1998, the staff at the Berks County facility required the children to
do pushups as a method of control and discipline."' Other accounts
of extreme physical abuse in the Berks County facility include
instances of guards beating minors and baiting them to fight.'f0 In the
Texas Liberty County Juvenile Detention Facility, a boy named
Oscar reported that guards used handcuffs and shackles regularly,
struck him on several occasions in the face and mouth, and shoved his
head in the toilet." He was placed in solitary confinement for three
days wearing nothing but his underwear."9
These extreme cases of human rights violations illustrate the
inhumanity of locking minors, who in some cases have already
suffered abuse, neglect, or abandonment, in facilities that use punitive
methods of control and lack proper services. For example, Oscar, the
boy who was beaten in the Texas facility, had lost both parents as a
child and the INS and other local government agency searches failed
to locate any other family."' The abuse he experienced in INS
detention compounded the trauma of his parents' death.
102. Id.
103. 1,000 Child Immigrants Worse off than Elian, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 2000 (citing
inhumane conditions of confinement for minors detained by the INS).
104. Interview with Denise Baez, CLINIC, Los Angeles, CA (Jan. 12,2000).
105. Interview with Cherylle Corpuz, Nationalities Service Center, Philadephia, PA
(Jan. 10, 2000). Detained and Deprived, supra note 65. In 1998 the INS maintained that it
had the authority to use restraints during the transport of minors. Id.
106. Id.
107. Interview with advocate (name confidential), Philadelphia, PA (Feb. 2,2000).
108. Interview with Steven Lang, South Texas Pro Bono Asylum Project (Feb. 1,
2000). Mr. Lang stated that the boy's account was verified by a female guard who was
later dismissed from the facility.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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Undoubtedly, what he needed was counseling and a supportive
structured living environment. Oscar is precisely the type of minor
the SIJ statute was intended to protect; yet he will not receive this
protection because of the INS's inability to provide such services and
its unwillingness to make use of non-secure facilities with such
services.
The mistreatment of minors in INS detention illustrates the
problem of placing vulnerable children in facilities that are not
equipped to provide adequate services. As Section I illustrated, state
and local child welfare systems have greater capacity than the federal
government to respond to matters of child abuse, neglect, and
abandonment.111 The cooperative state-federal approach of the SIJ
statute takes into account this state capacity. The statute requires the
INS to adjust its role and to trust state court determinations of
substantive information that the INS would otherwise need to verify
independently. The resistance of the INS to this change in roles was
exhibited in policy statements throughout the 1990s that excluded
minors in INS detention from SIJ status. Consequently, in many
cases detained minors are denied the opportunity to apply for SIJ
status and are either deported immediately or detained in
111. Of course, state systems are not immune from some of the problems with the INS
contracted facilities. In 1996, child welfare agencies in 21 states and the District of
Columbia were under court supervision due to systemic deficiencies that placed the safety
and care of children at risk. Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best
Interests of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 121 (1997) (citing
David Stoesz & Howard Jacob Karger, Suffer the Children: How Government Fails its
Most Vulnerable Citizens-Abused and Neglected Kids, WASH. MONTHLY, June 1996, at
20.) For examples of litigation that revealed widespread deficiencies in state and local
child welfare systems, see LaShawn v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing
1991 trial court conclusions that the Washington, D.C. foster care system "had failed to
comply with reasonable professional standards in almost every area of its child welfare
system") (internal quotations omitted); Baby Neal et aL v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 52 (3d Cir.
1994) (noting the "severe and widespread deficiencies" in Philadelphia's child welfare
system); G.L. v. Stangler, 873 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (substituting consent decree
to implement reforms in Missouri child welfare system); Marisol v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp.
660 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (considering motion to dismiss plaintiff class certification in litigation
against New York City's child welfare system).
Nationwide about one percent of child abuse reports made each year allege abuse
by state-authorized foster parents, and another two percent are made concerning
residential facility staff. Richard P. Barth, The Juvenile Court and Dependency Cases, THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: THE JUVENILE COURT, Winter 1996, 100, 105 (citing 1994 report
from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Center on Child
Abuse and Neglect).
Despite these significant problems, state and local child welfare systems on the




substandard facilities. This disparate treatment of children who are
first detained by the INS contravenes the express purpose of the SIJ
statute and its subsequent amendments.
11. A Child's Privacy and the Disclosure of Juvenile Court
Records to the INS
Another problem created by the SIJ statute's cooperative state-
federal system is the difficulty of protecting the minor's privacy from
unnecessary re-examination by the INS. As discussed in Section I,
when petitioning for SIJ status, minors must submit documentation
showing that a juvenile court has made the requisite orders and
findings rendering the minor eligible for SIJ status. The SIJ statute
does not require the minor to provide additional information to
support the juvenile court's determinations. In practice, however, the
INS has asked SIJ applicants to provide information pertaining to
abuse, neglect, abandonment, or other private matters. In addition
to the SIJ statute's own directive, other compelling concerns, most
notably the privacy of the minor, outweigh the INS's interest in
obtaining the child's personal history and juvenile court records. The
need for sensitivity with regard to these private materials is
recognized in federal laws that protect minors from unnecessary
disclosures of information regarding abuse, neglect, and
abandonment.
Although the SIJ statute only requires minors to present the
requisite juvenile court orders, the INS routinely seeks additional
information, either in writing or through personal interviews with the
minor. The INS has asked minors to offer additional documentation
about their family abuse, neglect, and abandonment, including
questions regarding physical or sexual abuse. By probing into such
private information about the minor's life, an INS officer may force a
minor to re-live the trauma in front of a complete stranger.
Some studies indicate that insensitive, repetitive, or unskilled
probing of a child's history of abuse, neglect, or abandonment during
an interview may cause stress or harm to the child."' National
112. See 58 Fed. Reg. 154 (1993) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 204)(requiring that
documentation be submitted showing that the juvenile court "has found the [minor] to be
dependent upon that court" and "eligible for long-term foster care," and "that it would
not be in the [minor's] best interest to be returned" to the minor's country of nationality
or the parents' last residence.).
113. See GAIL S. GOODMAN, et. al., TESTIFYING IN CRIMINAL COURT IN 57
MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1-2 (1992)
(concluding, based on two-year study of 218 children, that children may experience high
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reforms have moved to reduce the number of interviews a child must
undergo: federal legislation and legislation in thirty-three states
requires or encourages cooperation between law enforcement and
child protective services or the establishment of multidisciplinary
child protection teams to consolidate interview efforts."4 Courts and
legislatures have recognized the potential for psychological trauma to
a child who is forced to testify and thus have excluded such testimony
to protect the child."5
Although an INS officer's direct questioning of a minor may be
aimed at obtaining the "truth," the officer may obtain only inaccurate
information. Research over the past several decades consistently
demonstrates the difficulty of interviewing children and obtaining
reliable results. Compared to adults, children may be more
impressionable and subject to the influence of an examiner's
questioning. Research indicates that repetitive or leading questioning
and unconscious signaling through non-verbal cues may affect a
levels of anxiety from testimony) (cited in John E.B. Myers, Child Abuse: A Decade of
International Legal Reform Regarding Child Abuse Investigation and Litigation: Steps
Toward a Child Witness Code, 28 PAC. LJ. 169, n.3 (1996)). "[M]ultiple interviews are
thought to add stress to already vulnerable children." John E.B. Myers, et. al., Child
Abuse: Psychological Research on Children as Witnesses: Practical Implications for
Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3,17,74-75 (1996).
114. John E. B. Myers, Child Abuse: A Decade of International Legal Reform
Regarding Child Abuse Investigation and Litigation: Steps Toward a Child Witness Code,
28 PAC. L.J. 169, 178 (1996). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3509(g)(1), in cases
investigated by federal law enforcement officials, a "multi-disciplinary child abuse team
shall be used when it is feasible to do so."
115. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (recognizing that the state has a
compelling interest in protecting abused children from additional trauma and
embarrassment that may result from testimony); State v. Ford, 626 So. 2d 1338, 1345 (Fla.
1993) (noting that the state has an "interest in protecting a child witness from the trauma
of testifying in the presence of a defendant."); In re Jennifer J., 8 Cal. App. 4th 1080
(1992) (holding that child's testimony was properly excluded to prevent psychological
harm to child, even though child was competent and available to testify); California
permits courts to exclude testimony of a witness if testifying would result in the witness'
"suffering substantial trauma." CAL. EVID. CODE § 240. California law also states that in
sex offense cases "the court shall consider the needs of the child victim and shall do
whatever is necessary... and constitutionally permissible to prevent psychological harm
to the child victim." CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(d). In Alabama, a court has the authority to
limit the number of interviews that may be conducted upon a child under twelve who is
the alleged victim of sexual abuse to protect the victim from the psychological damage of
repeated interrogation. ALA. CODE § 15-1-2(a). West Virginia also allows the court to
limit the number of interviews of a "victim who is eleven years old or less" to protect the
mental and emotional health of the child from the psychological damage of repeated
interrogation. W. VA. CODE § 61-8-13(a). Numerous courtroom reforms have been
developed to accommodate the special concerns regarding child interviewing and
testimony. See Myers, supra note 113, at n.3.
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child's response.' The attitude or perceived bias of the interviewer
also may influence interview results."' Voluminous research
demonstrates that a skilled and sensitive interviewer is absolutely
essential when questioning a child regarding child abuse, neglect, or
abandonment."' If INS officers were trained to interview children the
INS could alleviate this problem, but presently the INS does not
provide such comprehensive training.
Congress passed laws in response to concerns that children will
be harmed from repetitive interviews, interviews conducted without
proper training, and compelled disclosure of experiences of abuse,
neglect, and other trauma."9 Federal laws mandate that states
preserve the confidentiality of juvenile court dependency and child
welfare agency records.'" In 1974, Congress enacted the Child Abuse
116. See Myers, supra note 113, at 10-14
117. See id.
118. See id. The importance of training child interviewers has been recognized
nationwide, and state and local child welfare agencies have embarked on training
programs to improve interview skills of caseworkers who work with children at risk of
abuse, neglect or abandonment. See Myers, supra note 113, at 176-177. Voluminous
research and written material that has been developed regarding proper interview
methods. Id. Pursuant to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, federal
law also encourages states to improve child welfare training and investigation methods. 42
U.S.C. §§ 5106a(5), 5106c.
119. See generally, Marcia Sprague and Mark Hardin, Coordination of Juvenile and
Criminal Court Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 35 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L.
239 (1996), Emily Bazelon, Note: Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the
Courtroom Doors Be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 155 (1999).
120. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA"), 42 U.S.C.
§5106a(b)(2)(A)(v), states, in relevant part, that every state receiving federal grants under
CAPTA must provide:
methods to preserve the confidentiality of all records in order to protect the
rights of the child and of the child's parents or guardians, including requirements
ensuring that reports and records made and maintained pursuant to the purposes
of this Act shall only be made available to: (I) individuals who are the subject of
the report; (II) Federal, State and local government entities, or any agent of such
entities, having a need for such information in order to carry out its
responsibilities under law to protect children from abuse and neglect;... VI)
other entities or classes of individuals statutorily authorized to receive such
information pursuant to a legitimate State purpose.
42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(v).
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA), 42 U.S.C. §
671(a)(8), requires that that states receiving federal funds establish a state foster care plan
that "provides safeguards which restrict the use of or disclosure of information concerning
individuals assisted under the State plan." AACWA allows for disclosure only for
specific purposes including: purposes directly connected with the administration of the
state's foster care plan; any investigation, prosecution, or criminal or civil proceeding,
conducted in connection with the administration of the plan; the administration of any
other Federal or federally assisted program which provides assistance, in cash or in kind,
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Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), which mandated that
participating states provide for methods to preserve the
confidentiality of "all records in order to protect the rights of the
child, his parent or guardians...' In addition to CAPTA, the 1980
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) also set
confidentiality standards requiring states to restrict "disclosure of
information concerning individuals" in the foster care system.'2
AACWA only allows release of information to another governmental
agency for purposes "directly connected with the administration" of
the child's foster care plan."i
Thus, federal confidentiality laws reinforce the well-established
policies regarding the treatment of minors who are the subject of
child abuse, neglect, or abandonment investigations. Until the INS
implements a more comprehensive training program for its SIJ
investigating officers, it should refrain from interviewing minors
regarding their personal and family history, their experience of abuse,
neglect, or abandonment, or other private matters that have already
been examined and reviewed by more qualified child welfare
professionals and the state juvenile court.
IV. Federal Preemption of State Court Jurisdiction
Underlying the disputes about the SIT statute described in
Sections II and III is a controversy over whether the states or the
or services, directly to individuals on the basis of need. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(8) AACWA
does not make any provision for release of information to a federal agency not directly
involved with the state foster care plan administration.
121. 42 U.S.C. §5106a. In 1992, CAPTA was amended to forbid states that receive
federal foster care funding from releasing records to government agencies unless
disclosure is required "to protect children from abuse and neglect" or is "statutorily
authorized... pursuant to a legitimate State purpose."
The legislative history of the 1992 CAPTA amendments indicates that the rules
for disclosure were designed to improve communication among agencies that had
information that would help protect a child at risk of abuse, neglect or abandonment. See
Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption and Family Services Act: Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 102d Cong. 126 (1992)
(statement of Mary Margaret Oliver, Ga. House of Rep.).
122. See Marcia Sprague & Mark Hardin, Coordination of Juvenile and Criminal Court
Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 35 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L. 239, 315
(Spring 1996). Laura Cohen, Section I: Developments in the United States: Kids, Courts,
and Cameras: New Challenges for Juvenile Defenders, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 701, 717
(1999) ("Records relating to child protective, preventive, and foster care services are
subject to the strict confidentiality rules of the federal Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act (AACWA) and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(CAPTA).").
123. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(8).
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federal government have the ultimate power over the custody and
placement of undocumented minors who have been abused,
neglected, or abandoned." Both federal and state entities have
legitimate bases for asserting authority over this population of
minors, thus creating the potential for competing claims for control.
As a general matter, within the United States constitutional system,
federal law is supreme, and a constitutional exercise of federal power
preempts any state interference. Federal preemption occurs,
however, only when the assertion of state power actually conflicts
with or frustrates the purposes of federal law."z  This section
considers under what circumstances, if any, an actual conflict occurs
between federal immigration regulation and state court jurisdiction
with regard to the treatment of undocumented minors who are
abused, neglected, or abandoned. By focusing on these conflicts, this
section explores the boundaries separating federal and state power.
This section lays the groundwork for asking an important question:
when both a state juvenile court and the INS have valid bases for
exercising authority over an undocumented child, which government
entity should exercise final authority?
In the early 1990s after the SIJ statute was passed, the INS began
denying applications for SIJ status on the ground that state courts
were interfering with the federal government's exclusive authority
over immigration matters.2 A few of these cases resulted in reported
court opinions. In these reported cases, the INS first detained the
minors, later releasing them to state-licensed foster care agencies,
which subsequently sought state juvenile court protection for the
minors." Even though the INS no longer had physical custody, it
retained legal custody over the minors." In response to the foster
124. See, e.g., In re Y.W., 1996 Minn. App. Lexis 1302, *8 n.4 (1996) (Randall, J.,
concurring) (unpublished decision) (characterizing the conflict as "a pure political turf
battle" between the INS and the state juvenile court).
125. See Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn. v Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining
Board, 467 U.S. 461,469 (1984); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132,142-43 (1963).
126. See Gao, 185 F.3d 548; In re C.M.K., 552 N.W.2d 768,771 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
See also In re Y.W., 1996 Minn. App. Lexis 1302, *8 n.4 (1996) (unpublished decision); In
re X, 1996 Immig. Rptr. Lexis 485; 16 Immig. Rptr. B 2-39 (INS Administrative Appeals
Unit, February 9, 1996) (stating without analysis that juvenile courts have no jurisdiction
to determine the custodial status or to enter dependency orders for juvenile aliens in
federal custody).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Gao, 185 F.3d at 551 ("The contract between the INS and [Lutheran
Social Services of Michigan] provides that 'these minors, although released to the physical
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families' action, the INS asserted that state court involvement-even
the exercise of jurisdiction-violated the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution by obstructing the INS's regulation of immigration and
that state court jurisdiction was therefore preempted.1 29 In two cases
state courts agreed with the INS," but in the 1999 decision, Gao v.
Jenifer,"3 the federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
state court's action did not obstruct the federal law's purposes of the
SIJ statute. 32
The specific holdings in these cases are no longer important
because Congress amended the SIJ statute in 1997 and enacted a
jurisdictional rule to govern conflicts over minors in INS legal
custody.33 But the courts' discussion of preemption raises the central
issue of whether a state court and the INS can share control over the
custody of an undocumented child. The 1997 jurisdictional rule was
Congress' answer to this question. Congress essentially concluded
that state courts and the INS could not share control over a minor
and restricted state court jurisdiction over minors in INS custody. In
examining the disputes between state courts and federal immigration
authorities, this section provides a context for evaluating whether the
1997 rule Congress enacted was necessary and whether that rule
effectively delegates responsibility between the federal government
and the states.
A. The Preemption Analysis of Gao and C.M.K.
In 1996, the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that a state
juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to order dependency on behalf of a
minor in INS legal custody and in deportation proceedings." In In
the Matter of the Welfare of C.M.K.," the INS had detained C.M.K.
custody of LSSM, shall remain in the legal custody of the INS."').
129. Id
130. See In re C.M.K., 552 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); In re Y.W., 1996
Minn. App. Lexis 1302, *8 n.4 (Minn. App. 1996) (unpublished decision).
131. 185 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1999).
132. See id
133. See discussion infra Section V. Although Congress enacted the jurisdictional rule
before the Sixth Circuit reached its decision in Gao, the Sixth Circuit held that the 1997
rule did not apply retroactively to Gao. 185 F.3d at 553 ("Because the threat of
deportation, and the ability to avoid that threat, implicate private rights, and Congress did
not explicitly dictate that the 1997 amendment should have retrospective application, we
decide this case according to the law in effect at the time Gao sought SIJ status.").
134. In re C.M.K., 552 N.W.2d 768,771 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
135. See id.
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and released him to a foster family. The foster family asked the state
court to exercise jurisdiction and protect the minor. When the state
court refused to take jurisdiction, the family appealed. The appellate
court determined that "federal immigration proceedings preempted
state court proceedings and, therefore, the state court was without
jurisdiction."1 6  Citing the United States Supreme Court, the
Minnesota court concluded that federal immigration law preempts
state law that interferes with the admission or exclusion of immigrants
and that a state court finding of dependency would "conflict with and
circumvent the immigration process." '137 Significant to the court's
decision was its determination that the petitioners "appear to be
requesting that the state court intercede and prohibit the INS...
from deporting [the minor] to a situation which would allegedly not
meet [the minor's] basic needs as defined by state law."'8 The
Minnesota court found state court jurisdiction preempted on the
ground that the petitioners sought to use state court dependency to
interfere with federal immigration policy.
Three years later in Gao, the Sixth Circuit came to the opposite
conclusion in a case involving remarkably similar facts.3 Just as in
C.M.K., in Gao the INS also released the minor to the foster agency
and retained legal custody while deportation proceedings were
pending.4 The major difference in Gao, however, was that the state
court took jurisdiction and found the minor dependent after the
foster agency sought state protection. 4' Subsequently, Gao
petitioned for SIJ status. The challenge to the state court's
jurisdiction arose when the INS denied Gao's petition. When Gao
appealed the INS's ruling in federal court, the INS argued that the
state court's exercise of jurisdiction violated sovereign immunity and
the Supremacy Clause.42 Contrary to the decision reached in C.M.K,
the Gao Court concluded that the state court's exercise of jurisdiction
"neither interferes with the public administration nor restrains the
[federal] government from acting, and sovereign immunity is not
offended.' 43  The state court had jurisdiction to declare Gao a
136. Id. at 770.
137. Id. at 770 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941)).
138. Id. at 771.
139. Gao, 185 F.3d 548.
140. I& at 551.
141. IdL at 551-52.
142. See id. at 553-54.
143. Id at 551-52.
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dependent of the court, "notwithstanding the fact that he was in INS
legal custody at the time."1" The state court's action, the Sixth Circuit
concluded, would not restrain or compel the INS with respect to
deportation or any- other immigration function.'45  Federal
immigration law and the Supremacy Clause, the Gao Court held, "do
not preempt state court jurisdiction over Gao."'"
Typically, state action regarding immigration-related matters is
deemed preempted under three possible circumstances.'47 First, state
action in a particular area is impermissible if Congress has effected a
"complete ouster of state power" by occupying the field that the state
attempts to regulate." As described in Section I, this category of
preemption does not apply in the child welfare context in which states
have carried significant responsibility for decades. Neither the
C.M.K. court nor the Gao court suggested that Congress had
"occupied" this area of regulation. In C.M.K., the court did not
discuss this type of preemption, but the Gao court noted that federal
immigration law "specifically delegates" certain determinations of SI
eligibility to state juvenile courts and is not "inhospitable to
supplementation.' 44 Thus, with regard to the regulation of
immigration and SIJ status, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Congress
sought the participation and involvement of juvenile courts, rather
than ousting them.
Second, state action that constitutes "regulation of immigration"
is constitutionally proscribed because the power to regulate
immigration is "unquestionably a federal power."" State action has
fallen into this second preemption category when states have sought
to regulate foreign affairs, trade, and other matters affecting relations
with other countries.' In Gao and C.M.K., the state courts' exercise
144. Id at 554 (internal quotations omitted).
145. See iL
146. Id at 556.
147. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,354-356 (1976).
148. d at 357. See also Northwest Cent. Pipeline v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kansas,
489 U.S. 493 (1989) (infering that a preemption is permitted when Congress "has
legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the
states to supplement federal law") (citing Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218
(1947)).
149. Gao, 185 F.3d at 555.
150. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 & 356 (1976). See, e.g., League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F.Supp. 755, 769-771 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (striking
down classification, notification, and cooperation/reporting provision of California's
Proposition 187 as "aimed solely at regulating immigration").
151. See e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (finding Oregon statute
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of jurisdiction over the minors would not have conferred any
immigration status upon the two minors who were the subject of the
petitions. The exercise of jurisdiction is not even a determination of
where the minor should live in the future. By exercising jurisdiction,
a state court asserts authority to make decisions that affect the
minor's immediate care and custody, not his or her immigration
status. Thus, regardless of the decision reached by the state court, the
federal government would still retain authority over the regulation of
immigration. The Sixth Circuit observed that "attaining SIJ status
would only entitle Gao to apply for permanent [resident] status-the
actual grant is both discretionary and conditioned." ' Any real
immigration benefit Gao received was based entirely on federal
immigration law, not state law, the Sixth Circuit observed. 3
Although a state court cannot make a decision regarding
immigration status, a state court might render an order that interferes
with federal regulation of immigration. Such state interference would
fall under the third category of preemption which forbids state action
that "stands as an obstacle" to the accomplishment of Congress'
objectives." The Minnesota court observed that the INS had
rendered an order of deportation that was being appealed. The court
was concerned that C.M.K's foster parents, the petitioners in state
court, were trying to block deportation by seeking the state court's
protection. '55
The problem with the C.M.K. Court's reasoning, however, is that
it anticipates a possible future conflict that has yet to occur, and in
fact may never occur. In order to trigger federal preemption, an
actual conflict must exist, rendering compliance with both federal and
state law impossible; a potential conflict is insufficient.56 A state
impermissibly regulated foreign relations and created the potential for international
embarrassment); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497,504 (1956) (holding that passage of
a federal sedition statute precluded state from adopting complementary or supplemental
legislation).
152. Gao, 185 F.3d at 554-55.
153. Id. at 554-55. "If the INS is ultimately prevented from deporting him it will be
because its own rules deem him non-deportable." Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
154. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 363.
155. In the Elian Gonzalez case, Elian's great uncle sought a temporary protective
order and legal guardianship in Florida family court after the INS rendered its decision
that Elian should be sent back to Cuba to be with his father. The state court exercised
jurisdiction and granted the uncle "limited legal authority" to protect Elian. The state
court action generated enormous controversy and some commentators questioned the
legitimacy of the state court's jurisdiction. See supra note 4.
156. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355; Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn., 467 U.S. at
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court's exercise of jurisdiction is a determination that the court has
the authority to make decisions and declare judgment in a case. The
exercise of jurisdiction is not a determination about where the child
will live or who will have custody over the child."' Those decisions
about placement and custody come after jurisdiction is asserted.58 In
C.M.K., the state court could have decided that it was in C.M.K.'s
best interest to return to China, and thereby comported with the
INS's position. Indeed, the Minnesota court noted that there was
evidence that C.M.K.'s parents would be able to adequately provide
for him.159 In practice, juvenile courts do return children to their
parents, sometimes sending minors across state and international
borders."6 Thus, an actual conflict between the state court and
federal law was not certain, or even likely, to occur if the state court
exercised jurisdiction over C.M.K. The speculative possibility that a
state court might obstruct a future INS deportation order is not the
type of conflict that justifies preemption. 6'
An actual conflict may arise if the INS obtains a non-appealable
469. But when state regulation of undocumented persons is perceived as interfering with
the conduct of foreign affairs or diplomacy it has been held preempted "even when the
state law is not inconsistent with any particular federal law." 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000) (citing Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1
(1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); and Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)).
157. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 300-04, 355, 360-66 (West 1998). In
California the determination that a juvenile court has jurisdiction focuses entirely upon
whether sufficient facts have been alleged and proven showing that the minor has suffered
abuse, neglect or abandonment as defined by statute. "At the jurisdictional hearing, the
court shall first consider only the question whether the minor is a person described by
Section 300." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 300,355.
158. In California, decisions regarding custody and placement of a child are governed
by separate statutory provisions and are generally rendered in hearings separate from
jurisdiction determinations. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 360-66.
159. See In re C.M.K, 552 N.W.2d at 770 ("C.M.K's parents did not abandon him;
rather he left his home of his own accord.").
160. See, e.g., In re Adolfo M., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1225 (1990) (affirming juvenile court's
order transferring minor to Mexican juvenile authorities); In re Manuel P., 215 Cal. App.
3d 48 (1989) (upholding constitutionality of state juvenile court order sending minor who
had been adjudicated delinquent returned to Mexico) cert. denied, Manuel P. v. California,
498 U.S. 832 (1990). See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 738 (authorizing court to order
return of minor to another state or foreign country where the minor's residence has been
established). See also, In re Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th 295 (1994) (overturning appellate
court's decision to return a minor to the custody of a relative residing in Mexico).
161. See, e.g., Arizona Farmworkers Union v. Phoenix Vegetable Distrib., 747 P.2d
574, 578 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (citing DeCanas standard and concluding that state law as it
applies to "illegal alien workers will not be preempted where the state regulation only has
'some purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration').
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final order of deportation against a minor and a state court orders
placement within the United States to be in the minor's best interest.
Under these circumstances, the state court order regarding placement
would likely be preempted by the federal INS order calling for
removal of the minor from the United States, unless federal law
dictated otherwise. In C.M.K. and Gao, however, there was neither a
final order of deportation nor a determination by the state court as to
where the minor should be placed or who should have custody over
the minor.62 Without a final order of deportation, the INS could not
act to remove Gao from the country. Under these circumstances, a
state court order placing Gao anywhere in the U.S. would not actually
conflict with any federal immigration law or policy.
The C.M.K. ruling is further undermined by the fact that the SIJ
statute calls for state court involvement in the SIJ adjudication
process. The SIJ statute requires minors to enter into the dependency
system first and then to apply for SIJ status. Whenever a minor who
is already in the juvenile dependency system applies for SIJ status, the
minor runs the risk that the INS will deny the petition and deport him
or her. If the Minnesota court's analysis were correct, a state-federal
conflict would occur in all cases where a state court exercises
jurisdiction over an undocumented child because, at some later date
when the INS learns of the child's presence in the United States, the
INS might decide to deport the child. Under the reasoning of
C.M.K., the state court would always be preempted from exercising
jurisdiction because a conflict could potentially arise in the future
between the state court and the INS. This procedure, however, is
exactly what the SIJ statute prescribed, and therefore the state court's
jurisdiction could not be preempted.
Furthermore, with regard to minors who are in INS legal custody
before a state court exercises jurisdiction, Congress clarified in 1991
that these minors could apply for SIJ status and lawful permanent
resident status."6  Congress anticipated that minors who enter the
162. See In re C.M.K., 552 N.W.2d at 769. An immigration court found C.M.K.
deportable on March 6, 1995. C.M.K. appealed this order to the Board of Immigration
Appeals which remanded the case on September 11, 1995. In October 1995, when the
foster family filed its petition in the state court, there was no final order of deportation
that would authorize the INS to remove C.M.K. from the country. See id In Gao,
deportation proceedings began on February 17, 1994. 185 F.3d at 551-52. Before any final
order of deportation was obtained against Gao, he petitioned for SIJ status in September
1994. See iL
163. See generally, Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization
Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-323 (1991) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255).
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country illegally may also have experienced family abuse, neglect, and
abandonment, and passed legislation enabling these minors to obtain
SIJ relief. As described above, the procedure for applying for SIJ
status requires the minor to enter the state juvenile dependency
system. Accordingly, minors in INS legal custody, like C.M.K. and
Gao, were not frustrating Congress' goals by seeking the juvenile
courts' assistance. In fact they were seeking federal SIJ relief
pursuant to Congress' intent to protect them under the statute. A
state court's exercise of jurisdiction did not conflict with Congress'
immigration goals, but, in fact, comported with federal policy. By
finding state court jurisdiction preempted, the Minnesota court of
appeals failed to account for the purpose of the SIJ statute.
1
The Sixth Circuit's preemption analysis was more consistent with
the Supreme Court's view that preemption should be applied
reluctantly'65 and under conditions making "compliance with both
state and federal law impossible."' Preemption only occurs if that is
Congress' express purpose or if dual compliance cannot be
accomplished. The Supreme Court's reluctance to preempt in the
presence of ambiguity is intended to protect states' interests from
unnecessary intrusion by the federal government, particularly in areas
of regulation traditionally occupied by the states.67 The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that the state court could exercise jurisdiction while federal
deportation proceedings were ongoing without creating an actual
164. Finally, the precise holding of the Minnesota Court of Appeals is unclear. The
opinion begins by announcing that the state court's jurisdiction was preempted by INS
legal custody and the deportation proceedings. At this point, by virtue of its own
conclusion, the Minnesota court should have dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Instead it reviewed the substantive facts regarding C.M.K's experience of abuse and
neglect and used those facts to explain why state court jurisdiction was preempted. By
engaging in this additional analysis, the court obscured its holding. Under C.M.K.'s
analysis, it remains unclear whether preemption is triggered simply by INS legal custody
and ongoing deportation proceedings or whether something more is required. See In re
C.M.K., 552 N.W.2d at 770.
165. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Sheathing the Sword of Federal Preemption, 5 CONST.
COMMENTARY 311,317 (1988) (noting the Court's extreme reluctance to find preemption
unless compliance with both the federal law and state action and is "physically
impossible"). See generally, Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 462 n. 213 (1989); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746
(1981).
166. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, 467 U.S. at 469.
167. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("we begin 'with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States [are] not to be superseded... unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress."'). Hilsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719
(1985) (regulating health and safety matters belongs traditionally to the states).
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conflict. Moreover, the immigration decision rested firmly with the
INS. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the state court could not grant
immigration status to Gao and thus was not regulating immigration in
violation of the rules of preemption."
Significant to the Sixth Circuit's ruling was the conclusion that
the Supremacy Clause does not divest the state court of jurisdiction
over minors "in INS custody." '169 Even though the federal government
has complete authority over immigration regulation, it cannot oust
state court jurisdiction except when an actual conflict occurs between
the state and federal governmental entities. Thus, under Gao, when
the INS detains a minor and initiates deportation proceedings, a state
court may still exercise jurisdiction over the minor.17
168. In 1987, in the context of labor and immigration law, the Court of Appeals of
Arizona applied a similar preemption analysis as the Sixth Circuit in Gao. See Arizona
Farm Workers Union v. Phoenix Vegetable Distrib., 747 P.2d 574 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
In Arizona Farm Workers Union, the trial court granted the union's motion for a
preliminary injunction ordering reinstatement of five union members who had been
dismissed for engaging in union activities at Phoenix Vegetable Distributors. Id. at 575.
The employer argued on appeal that the state court could not order the dismissed
employees' reinstatement because federal law prohibited the reinstatement of
undocumented workers and federal law preempts state law. See id The Court of Appeal
rejected the employer's preemption argument concluding that the order of reinstatement
"does not actually conflict with federal law." lId at 578. The court determined that a
reinstatement order "does not restrain or limit the ability of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to deport illegal aliens. Although once reinstated an illegal alien
worker may have a greater incentive to remain in the United States, an appropriate
federal order of deportation is fully enforceable." It The court concluded that the
reinstatement would "have no more than some purely speculative and indirect impact
upon immigration" which is insufficient to invoke preemption. lId (internal quotations
omitted).
169. See Gao, 185 F.3d at 551.
170. But see Final Order, Gonzalez v. Gonzalez-Quintana, No. 00-00479-FC-28 (Fla.
Fam. Ct., 11th Cir. April 13, 2000). In the Elian Gonzalez case, the uncle sought a
temporary protective order from state family court to obtain "custody of the child." Id. at
10. The state court dismissed the action concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, in part,
because federal immigration power preempted state court power. Id. at 8-12. Like the
Minnesota court in C.M.K., the Florida court was concerned that the "case is designed to
keep Elian Gonzalez in Miami over the federal government's and his father's objection
and under the name of a custody claim." Id at 10. The court cited C.M.K. favorably for
the proposition that a state court cannot make immigration decisions or interfere with the
federal immigration power. Id. at 12. The Florida court distinguished Gao but did not
offer an explanation as to how Gao was different from C.M.K. See id. at 11-12. The
Florida court did not explain how an actual conflict would occur by the exercise of
jurisdiction or why state court jurisdiction would constitute regulation of immigration.
The Florida court dismissed the importance of family law principles: "While the
court recognizes the many, many authorities that establish that domestic relations, family
law, is an area reserved to the state courts, Petitioner fails to recognize the fundamental
nature of his case-it is an immigration case not a family case." Id. at 10. As the INS
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B. Preemption in the Juvenile Delinquency Context
The Sixth Circuit decision in Gao also comports with the
preemption analysis applied in two non-SIJ cases decided by the
California Court of Appeal in the context of juvenile delinquency
proceedings.' While there are differences between delinquency and
dependency proceedings, these two California cases are among the
few reported court opinions that consider whether a state court is
preempted by federal immigration law from making a custody or
placement determination for an undocumented minor." In the
absence of additional legal authority on the subject, these cases offer
a point of comparison for evaluating federal preemption of state court
actions in the dependency context.
In 1989, in In re Manuel P., the California Court of Appeal
concluded that it is a violation of the Supremacy Clause or
preemption principles for a state juvenile court to order an
adjudicated delinquent minor to be returned to his country of origin,
so long as that order is subject to a final deportation order by the
federal government.' Manuel P. was an undocumented minor from
Mexico who had already been deported once and subsequently
reentered the United States.74 Soon thereafter he was arrested by the
police for stealing food and was adjudicated delinquent.' 5 The
juvenile court first ordered him placed in a state juvenile facility with
the expectation that he would be released to the INS when state
jurisdiction terminated. The minor challenged the state court's power
when, pursuant to a state arrangement with the Mexican
acknowledged, however, family law principles were critical to its determination that Elian
should be returned to his father. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
171. See In re Adolfo M., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1225 (1990); In re Manuel P. 215 Cal. App.
3d 48 (1989). See also, Roberta M. v. Sandra Davis, No. Civ 99-08451 CM, (C.D. Cal.
1999) (unpublished decision on file with the author). There does not appear to be case
law in other states that addresses whether a state court violates the Supremacy Clause by
placing a delinquent minor out of the United States.
172. For example, although both dependency and delinquency proceedings are
technically civil proceedings, delinquency proceedings involve adjudications as to a
minor's "guilt" and the "criminality" of the minor's behavior that are not involved in
dependency proceedings. Another difference is that children involved in dependency
proceedings are often viewed as "victims" of actions by others who need society's
protection. By comparison, children in delinquency proceedings are more frequently
viewed as "perpetrators" who may have harmed society.
173. See In re Manuel P., 215 Cal. App. 3d at 66.
174. See id. at 53.
175. See id.
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government,176 the court ordered him released from the state facility
into INS custody to undergo federal deportation proceedings."
Manuel P. argued that the state-negotiated agreement with Mexico
violated the Supremacy Clause and the Constitution's exclusive
delegation of foreign relations power to the federal government.'78
The Manuel P. Court, nonetheless, concluded that the court
order did not constitute "regulation of immigration" or a
"deportation process."' The court reached its decision relying upon
reasoning similar to that of the Sixth Circuit in Gao. In both cases,
the state courts' rulings - exercising jurisdiction in Gao and ordering
return to Mexico in Manuel P. - still left the final immigration
decision to the INS."' The Manuel P. Court held that the federal
government, not the state court, made the immigration ruling.8'
Furthermore, because the final decision regarding the minors'
immigration status rested with the INS, the Manuel P. and Gao
Courts determined that the state courts' rulings did not actually
conflict with any federal law or purpose." Absent an actual federal-
state conflict, both courts held that preemption was not required.
In 1990, in In re Adolfo M., the California Court of Appeal
affirmed its holding in Manuel P. that ajuvenile court does not
violate federal supremacy by ordering a minor sent out of the United
States, so long as the final deportation order is reviewed and
approved by federal immigration authorities. 2 This requirement that
a state court first present a minor to the federal immigration
authorities was further clarified in 1999 in an unreported case,
176. See id at 54-56. The state program established a procedure for the return of
undocumented minors to their home country. For example, the state law authorizing the
procedure allows for expenditure of county funds to pay for the transport of the minor to
"appropriate foreign authorities." The law also authorizes state officials to accompany
minors during the transfer. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 738.
177. See id. at 62-64.
178. See id at 60-61.
179. Id at 62-63 (citing the De Canas v. Bica standard of preemption that regulation of
immigration is "essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into
the country and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain."); see also id at 66
(internal quotations omitted).
180. See In re Manuel P, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 63.
181. Id. at 63-64 ("Significantly the record reflects all minors (including Manuel)
returned to Mexico under section 738 are first presented to the INS for processing through
the federal deportation system.").
182. See id. at 63-64.
183. See In re Adolfo M., 225 Cal. App. 3d at 1233.
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Roberta M. v. Sandra Davis."4 In Roberta M., the state juvenile court
ordered a young girl returned directly to Romania without any
federal immigration review." The federal court granted the minor's
petition for a preliminary injunction, noting that the state court order,
unlike the state court action in Manuel P., completely bypassed the
federal authorities and amounted to "de facto deportation.
'' 6
Taken together, the decisions in Roberta M., Manuel P., Adolfo
M., and Gao illustrate that a state court has authority to decide the
custody and placement status of an undocumented minor in either
dependency or delinquency proceedings. The Gao ruling concluded
that a state juvenile court has the power to make decisions that will
impact an undocumented minor's immediate custody status even if
the INS retains legal custody of the minor. The Roberta M., Manuel
P., and Adolfo M. decisions held that a state juvenile court could,
with federal approval, order an undocumented minor's return to his
or her home country. Thus, in the absence of a specific congressional
rule governing state and federal jurisdictional issues, these courts held
that state court power was not surrendered, despite the substantial
overlap that existed between the federal and state governmental roles
regarding a minor's placement and custody status."
Manuel P., Roberta M., and Adolfo M. are consistent with the
position taken in Gao that the exercise of state court jurisdiction over
a minor does not, by itself, create an actual conflict with federal
immigration goals. Subsequent decisions by a state court made after
jurisdiction is exercised, such as a decision to send a minor out of the
United States, could actually conflict with immigration goals and
might ultimately require that federal law preempt state law.
While federal preemption may not be triggered by the exercise of
state court jurisdiction, this article agrees that it was necessary for
184. Roberta M. v. Davis, No. Civ 99-08451 CM (C.D. Cal. September 10, 1999)
(decision on file with the author).
185. If. at 14.
186. See id. at 14-15.
187. In Adolfo M., the California Court of Appeal concluded that the state juvenile
court could not require that the minor first obtain the juvenile court's permission prior to
reentering the United States. In re Adolfo M., 225 Cal. App. 3d. at 1231-33. The court
stated that "state regulation affecting the determination of who should or should not be
admitted into the country or placing conditions under which a legal entrant may remain,
violates the exclusive power over immigration and deportation constitutionally vested
solely in the federal government." Id. at 1232 (citing DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. at 354-57).
The court noted that it would be proper for the juvenile court to "simply echof existing
federal requirements," but it may not require "additional state-imposed conditions on
one's right to enter." Id- at 1233.
Congress to establish a federal jurisdictional rule. A federal rule
would help avoid the tensions that arose in the 1990s between the INS
and state courts over undocumented minors. In Section V, the article
considers what kind of federal jurisdictional rule Congress should
enact to govern state courts and the INS regarding the treatment of
undocumented children who are abused, neglected, or abandoned.
V. The 1997 Amendments: Congress' Solution to the Federal-
State Conflicts
Ever since the SIJ statute came into effect, the INS has resisted
state court involvement, particularly in cases involving children
already in INS legal custody."' Earlier sections of this article
demonstrated that the SIJ statute's state-federal scheme requires the
INS to rely upon state court orders and to relinquish some of the
authority it usually exercises when granting immigration benefits."l
The INS, however, voiced concerns that state courts were granting
dependency to undocumented children who had not been abused,
neglected, or abandoned. In 1997, the concerns of the INS struck a
chord with Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico, who alleged in
Senate hearings that minors were fraudulently petitioning for SIJ
status and asked the Attorney General to investigate the fraud."l
Senator Domenici described three SIJ cases in which individuals,
some of whom were more than 18 years old, sought juvenile court
protection, but had been sent to the United States as foreign students.
According to the Senator, these individuals should not have been able
to enter the dependency system or obtain SIJ status.19'
The Attorney General never released a report to the public
regarding investigations into the alleged immigration fraud."9  By
188. See Interpreter Releases 1148 (April 23, 1996) (INS Legal Opinion) (on file with
author); INS General Counsel Opinion 95-11, CO 215.2 and 232.1, June 30, 1995 (stating
INS concerns about state court decisions).
189. See supra Sections II and III.
190. INS Provides Interim Field Guidance on Special Immigrant Juveniles, 75
Interpreter Releases 1445, No. 40 (October 19, 1998). See Hearings on the FY '98 Budget
Request Before Senate Appropriatons Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State
(March 1997)(comments by Senator Pete Domenici).
191. See id.
192. Senator Domenici requested a Justice Department inquiry, but the Attorney
General never released any report of investigations that may have been completed, and
neither the 1997 amendments nor its legislative history makes reference to any such
investigation. See Pete Domenic Senator, Senate, Attorney General Reviewing Potential
Abuse of Immigration Law, Congressional Press Releases, (March 12, 1997); Conference
Committee Report, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113 (1997) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
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themselves, the three cases the Senator cited represent a small
number compared to the 430 minors granted SIJ status that year or
the more than 200,000 individuals under 20 years old who were
lawfully admitted under various immigration categories in 1997.1"3
The Senator's remarks, however, coincided with the INS's growing
concerns about immigration fraud. 4 To address the problem that a
"loophole" might exist in the SIJ statute, Congress amended the
statute by tightening the requirements for obtaining SIJ status and
giving the INS greater authority over juveniles who apply for SIJ
status. 95
Among other changes, the amended statute included a
jurisdictional provision which states that "no juvenile court has
jurisdiction to determine the custody status or placement of an alien
in the actual or constructive custody of the Attorney General unless
the Attorney General specifically consents to such jurisdiction."'"
The remainder of this article evaluates the 1997 jurisdictional
provision and considers whether this rule ultimately achieves both
federal child protection and immigration regulation goals. An
effective rule would also need to resolve the federal-state tensions
that arose in Gao and C.M.K. This section argues that the 1997
provision imposed restrictions on state court jurisdiction that may
§1101(a)(27)(J)).
193. In 1997, 430 SIJ applicants were admitted as lawful permanent residents. 1997
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 36
(1999). In 1996, 390 SIT applicants were admitted as lawful permanent residents. 1996
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 38
(1997). In 1997, 236,930 immigrants under the age of 20 were admitted to the United
States. In 1996, 280,297 were admitted. 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 52 (1999). Note, SI status may be
sought until an individual reaches the age of 21. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1).
194. See Memorandum from Thomas E. Cook, Acting Assistant Commission,
Adjudications Division, United States Department of Justice, INS on Interim Field
Guidance relating to Public Law 105-119 (Sec. 113) amending Section 11(a)(27)(J) of the
INA - Special Immigrant Juveniles (Aug. 7, 1998) (on file with author)("In the past,
individuals who did not suffer abuse, abandonment, or neglect were known to have sought
the court's protection merely to avail themselves of legal permanent resident status.").
195. See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (amended on November 27,1997).
196. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) (amended on November 27, 1997). The amended
statute also required proof that the juvenile court rendered its decision to address abuse,
neglect, or abandonment rather than to enable the minor to obtain lawful immigration
status. The amendments added language to the statute requiring that the grant of an SIJ
petition required the Attorney General's express consent.
"Juvenile court" is defined in 1993 federal regulations as "a court located in the
United States having jurisdiction under State law to make judicial determinations about
the custody and care of juveniles." 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2000).
jeopardize the very children whom the SIJ statute was intended to
protect. The section proposes legislative or regulatory alternatives
that might better accomplish federal goals.
A. The Potential Risks to the Safety of Immigrant Children
Congress enacted the 1997 amendments with minimal debate and
little reported legislative history.'9' The rationale behind the
jurisdiction-limiting provision, however, is straightforward. To
address the immigration fraud concern, Congress limited state court
jurisdiction over minors already in INS legal custody. In giving the
INS exclusive authority over children in its legal custody, Congress
sought to prevent minors from independently seeking state juvenile
court protection and evading INS control over them. With the
passage of the 1997 provision, a minor in INS legal custody can only
obtain state court protection if the Attorney General consents, thus
making the INS the effective gatekeeper to state court protective
services. By establishing a bright line rule regarding state court
jurisdiction, the 1997 amendments also reduced the possibility for
further disputes between state courts and the INS, such as those
which occurred in Gao and C.M.K.
The principal risk associated with the jurisdictional provision is
that the process for obtaining the Attorney General's consent will
likely be time consuming and burdensome. A 1999 INS policy
memorandum states that the Attorney General's consent must be
obtained by submitting a written request to the local INS district
director before state court dependency proceedings are begun.198 In
practice, the INS has sometimes taken several weeks to respond to
197. Aside from Senator Domenici's statements to the Attorney General (see supra
note 190 (comments of Senator Pete Domenici), the only reported legislative history for
the 1997 amendments is a brief conference committee report which states that the
amendments were enacted "to address several problems in the implementation" of the SIJ
statute. See Conference Committee Report, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113 (1997) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27(J). The report reiterates that the statute was intended to protect
"abandoned, neglected or abused children" and acknowledges that the "involvement of
the Attorney General is for the purpose of determining special immigrant juvenile status
and not for making determinations of dependency status." The report concludes by
stating that "in order to preclude State juvenile courts from issuing dependency orders for
juveniles in actual or constructive custody of the INS, the modified provision removes
jurisdiction from juvenile courts to consider the custody status or placement of such aliens
unless the Attorney General specifically consents." Id.
198. See Memorandum from Thomas E. Cook, Acting Assistant Commissioner,
Adjudications Division, United States Department of Justice, INS on Special Immigrant
Juveniles - Memorandum #2: Clarification of Interim Field Guidance (July 9, 1999)(on file
with author).
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requests for consent." While the Attorney General is considering a
minor's request for consent, the minor is forced to wait and will not
be able to receive state child welfare protection and services. A delay
of several weeks or even a few days could jeopardize a child's safety,
even his or her life.
A social worker in the Florida Boystown facility, which holds
INS detained minors, stated that the sensible course of action to take
if a minor is abused inside the facility would be to contact the state or
local child welfare agency. Unlike the INS, child welfare agencies are
designed to respond to emergencies." ° On occasion, minors have run
away from INS placements, particularly non-secure placements."0'
They may seek help from local police and child welfare agencies that
would be unable to intervene in the absence of prior consent from the
Attorney General.
The importance of having rapid response systems to child abuse
need not be restated. Generally, the police and child welfare agencies
have the authority to bring minors into protective custody. Within a
certain statutorily prescribed timeframe, a petition must be filed and,
in many states, a judicial hearing must be held in less than forty-eight
hours.2' If the state court cannot conduct the hearing because the
Attorney General has not consented to the state court's jurisdiction,
the minor would have to be released from custody. By requiring child
welfare systems to wait for Attorney General approval, even for a few
days, the consent requirement frustrates many state statutory
deadlines and, more importantly, risks the safety of undocumented
children.
199. Interview with Christina Kleiser, Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center (Feb. 14,
2000). See Catherine Wilson, Judge Promises to Decide Somali Teen-ager's INS Case
Soon, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 17,2000.
200. Interview with Liliana Avedano, Boystown Florida of the Catholic Charities of
the Archdiocese of Miami (Feb. 2,2000).
201. For example, a Texas attorney reported that a boy named Oscar ran from an INS
foster placement because he could not adjust to the conditions of confinement in the
detention facility. Interview with Steven Lang, South Texas Pro Bono Asylum Project,
Harlingen Texas.
202. See SHIRLEY A. DOBBIN, ET AL., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES: A
NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF STATE STATUTES, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND
FAMILY COURT JUDGES (1998). The following states require the filing of a petition with
the juvenile court within 12 hours of taking a minor into custody: AK and NC. Filing of
petition within 24 hours: OH, MA, and NJ. Filing of petition within 48 hours: AZ, HI, SD,
CA, NE, NM, WV, and MT. The following states require that an emergency hearing be
held within 24 hours of taking a minor into custody or the filing of a petition: CA, MD,
DC, FL, MI, MS, TX, OR, and NH. Emergency hearing within 48 hours: AK, IL, SD, WI,
HI, ID, KS, NE, OK, and VT.
The INS could reduce the risks associated with the jurisdictional
provision by implementing its own rapid response system to
emergency requests for consent. For example, if the INS established
a twenty-four-hour hotline to review consent requests, this would
reduce the likelihood that a child would be further endangered. As
previous sections of this article have argued, however, the INS is not
presently equipped to respond to emergencies and does not have the
expertise and capacity to evaluate individual cases of child abuse,
neglect, or abandonment. In 1993 the INS acknowledged that it
would be "inappropriate to impose consultation requirements upon
the juvenile courts" or child welfare agencies because such
requirements could "delay action urgently needed" to protect
children. 3  Creating a new federal response system would also
require substantial resources, whereas states and local governments
already have systems in place that can respond to emergency cases of
child abuse or neglect. Unless the INS implements a better response
system, it is doubtful that the INS would be able to review requests
for the Attorney General's consent in a timely fashion. In the
meantime, states would be forced to abandon protection efforts on
behalf of many undocumented children, ironically contravening the
purpose of the SIJ statute to protect children who are survivors of
abuse, neglect, and abandonment.
An additional problem with the jurisdictional provision is that,
under the INS's policy, the INS will assess the "best interest" of the
minor when evaluating a request for the Attorney General's consent.
As Section I explained, assessing a child's best interest is a task that
state courts are better able to perform than the INS because of the
INS's inherent conflict of interest. ' The cooperative state-federal
structure of the SIJ statute also supports this view that determinations
of a child's best interest and of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment
should be made by state courts, not the INS. The SIJ statute removes
from the INS the authority for assessing the minor's personal
experience of abuse, neglect or abandonment. The 1997 jurisdictional
provision undermines this structure by requiring the INS to make
difficult individualized determinations in an area where it lacks
203. Special Immigrant Status: Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a Juvenile
Court, Final Rule, Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Supplementary Information, 8 C.F.R. Parts 101, 103,204,205, and 245 (2000).
204. See Cook, supra note 198, at 2 (requiring the local INS district director to consent
if: "1) it appears that the juvenile would be eligible for SU status if a dependency order is
issued; and 2) in the judgment of the district director, the dependency proceeding would
be in the best interest of the juvenile.").
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expertise and administrative capacity.
Finally, it is questionable whether the 1997 jurisdictional rule
would prevent the type of immigration fraud that Senator Domenici
described, in which foreign students were allegedly using the SIJ
statute improperly to gain lawful permanent residence. Although the
factual details in these cases were never provided by Senator
Domenici, the foreign students he described were probably not in
INS legal custody at the time they applied for SIJ status. If, in fact,
the students were not in INS custody, the 1997 rule would not apply
because the rule restricts state court jurisdiction only over minors in
INS legal custody. Other provisions in the 1997 amendments may
address the Senator's fraud concerns, but the jurisdictional provision
does not.'
Although the jurisdictional provision may have been enacted
with important goals in mind, such as the reduction of immigration
fraud, the provision may hinder the INS from protecting abused,
neglected, or abandoned immigrant children. In order to avoid
problems with the provision, the INS could change its current
practices and commit additional resources to protect abused,
neglected, or abandoned, undocumented children. Alternatively, the
INS or Congress could adopt a different policy that would authorize
states to continue protecting immigrant children and thereby place
fewer administrative burdens on the INS. Before turning to the
possible regulatory and legislative alternatives, the article considers in
greater detail the impact of the 1997 jurisdictional provision.
B. The Scope of the 1997 Amendments' Jurisdictional Provision
The precise scope of the jurisdictional provision-and which
class of minors it impacts-remains unclear due to Congress's use of
the word "constructive" to define INS custody. This term is not used
elsewhere in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).' 6 Custody
is more commonly described as "legal custody," "physical custody,"
or simply "custody." "Actual custody" is comparable with physical
custody and probably applies to minors held in federal INS facilities
under the custodial care of an INS officer or in INS contracted
205. One provision which may prevent fraud requires that the state court's
determination that the minor is eligible for long term foster care be "due to abuse, neglect
or abandonment." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i).
206. A Lexis search of the United States Code yielded no other instance in which the
word "constructive" appeared within five words of "custody." The term "legal custody"
appeared approximately seven times. The term "physical custody" is used frequently in
the Code.
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facilities under the care of a private institution or a state or local
agency. ' 7 The term "constructive custody," however, likely covers a
much broader range of cases. In other contexts, such as habeas
corpus jurisdiction, courts have concluded that constructive custody
includes individuals released on their own recognizance.' Federal
caselaw also indicates that minors who are subject to a final
deportation order but are not under any kind of physical detention
would also fall under the definition of constructive custody.' If
constructive custody encompasses these cases, then minors released
to their families by the INS (generally with a signed release from the
family, with a bond or by parole) while INS proceedings are ongoing
would also be in INS constructive custody. In each of these
situations, the INS would retain some legal control over the
individual, despite the absence of physical control.
As of September 2000, the INS had not issued regulations
interpreting the 1997 amendments' use of the terms "actual or
constructive custody.""21  In the absence of controlling federal
regulations, INS policy has, at various times and in different regions,
been inconsistent and contradictory. In 1998, the INS issued an
official memorandum setting nationwide INS policy that equated
"constructive custody" with foster care.21 Based on this
207. See United States ex reL Marcello v. District Dir. of INS, 634 F.2d 964, 967 (5th
Cir. 1981) (clarifying that the phrase "held in custody" means actual, physical custody in
place of detention).
208. See Gutierrez-Martinez v. Reno, 989 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (N.D. Ga. 1998) rev'd
and remanded on other grounds Mayers v. INS, 175 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1999) ("A party
released on bond following commencement of actual, physical custody in connection with
a deportation proceeding satisfies the "in-custody" requirement" for habeas purposes.).
See also Cantillon v. Superior Court, 305 F.Supp. 304, 306-07 (C.D. Cal. 1969) remanded,
442 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1971) (describing that a Habeas corpus petitioner "is only in
constructive custody.., having been released on his own recognizance.... The type of
custody imposed on him is analogous to ... that of a person released on bond after being
charged with being a deportable alien."). For a definition of "constructive custody" in the
context of U.S. customs custody of imported goods, see United States v. Harold, 588 F.2d
1136 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing that imported goods are in constructive custody of
Customs Service from moment of their arrival in United States port until their formal
release by Service, regardless of whether it has actual, physical possession.).
209. See Mustata v. United States Dept. of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1021 n.4 (6th Cir.
1999) (noting that undocumented persons were in constructive custody where their period
of voluntary departure expired and they faced final order of deportation on day they filed
habeas petition.).
210. As of June 2000, the INS was still in the process of drafting regulations for public
comment.
211. See Cook, supra note 194, at 2. The "revision of the [SIJ statute] clarifies that
state courts do not have jurisdiction to consider the status of an alien in the actual or
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memorandum, minors released into family custody are not in INS
"constructive custody." The memorandum is supported by a 1996
INS statement that minors who had been released to family are not in
"INS custody" and by the 1996 nationwide settlement agreement in
the Flores v. Reno litigation signed by the INS.2  Another INS
memorandum issued in 1999 did not define the term "constructive
custody," but instead used the general term "INS custody.,2" As long
as the 1998 and 1999 memoranda remain in effect, it appears that
minors who are in the custody of family or other adults are not in INS
"constructive custody" and may seek protection from a state juvenile
court without the consent of the Attorney General.
In March 2000, however, the INS Administrative Appeals Unit
(AAU) adopted a much broader interpretation of the 1997
amendments in a Massachusetts case, In re G.L * 4 The case involved
a 17-year-old Chinese boy, G.L., who was detained by the INS,
paroled, and released into the custody of his aunt after posting a
constructive custody (foster care) of the Service.... " This memorandum is consistent
with a previous memorandum issued prior to the enactment of the amendments which
stated that minors who had been paroled to family are not in INS custody. See INS Legal
Opinion, 73 Interpreter Releases 1148,1150 (Apr. 23,1996).
212. See INS Legal Opinion, 73 Interpreter Releases 1148 (Apr. 23, 1996); Flores v.
Reno, No. CV 85-4544 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (stipulated settlement agreement, at 11-12).
213. See Cook, supra note 198, at 1-2.
The 1997 amendments to the SIJ statute included another provision discussing the
need for the Attorney General's consent. (Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii) with 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(iii)(I)). The amended statute states, in relevant part, that a minor
qualifies as a special immigrant "in whose case the Attorney General expressly consents to
the dependency order serving as a precondition to the grant of special immigrant juvenile
status." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(ii).
Because the 1997 SIJ statute included two provisions requiring Attorney General
consent, INS officers had difficulty implementing the policy consistently. See INA § 101
(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I). For example, the August 7, 1998 INS memorandum stated that state
courts must obtain INS consent "as a precondition to the issuance of dependency orders."
Cook, supra note 194, at 1-2. This INS memorandum created confusion in the processing
of SIJ applications because some INS offices believed that state courts would have to
obtain the Attorney General's consent before issuing orders even in cases where minors
were not in INS custody. If this interpretation were correct, state courts would be stripped
of jurisdiction over all undocumented minors-whether or not in INS custody-until the
INS consented.
The July 9, 1999 memorandum clarified that state courts do not need to obtain
INS consent to take jurisdiction over minors not in INS custody. See Cook, supra note
198, at 2.
214. See In re G.L. Admin. Appeals Unit (2000) (decision on file with the author);
Interviews with Halim Moris and Zenobia Lai, Greater Boston Legal Services, Boston,
MA (Jan. - Mar. 2000).
$3000 bond."5  After the minor came under state juvenile court2
custody and applied for SIJ status, the INS denied the minor's SIJ
petition on the ground that the INS had never formally consented to
the juvenile court's jurisdiction.1 The minor, through his counsel,
argued unsuccessfully on appeal that INS consent to jurisdiction was
not required because children released to family are not in INS
custodyl 8 In essence, the AAU decision interpreted "constructive
custody" as encompassing even minors who have been released and
paroled into the country. The minor's position was supported by the
previous INS policy statements and the Flores settlement agreement.
In the absence of INS regulations interpreting the 1997 amendments,
one can only speculate as to whether the G.L. decision or the various
INS policy memoranda will dictate the rule regarding minors in INS
custody.
If the INS retains the interpretation adopted in G.L. that minors
who are paroled to family are in INS constructive custody, the
jurisdiction-limiting provision of the 1997 amendments would cover
an expansive set of cases.219 Specifically, the amendments would limit
state juvenile court jurisdiction in cases in which the minor has been
released to family and other adults, as well as foster homes and
215. See, In re G.L., at 3 ("[T]he petitioner was paroled and released into the custody
of his maternal aunt after the posting of an Immigration Bond in the amount of $3000.").
216. The state court that took jurisdiction was the Massachusetts Probate and Family
Court, but for the sake of consistency, this article retains the term "juvenile court" as it is
defined under the federal regulations, essentially any state court with the authority to
make "determinations about the custody and care of juveniles." 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a)
(2000).
217. SeelnreG.L.,at3.
218. See id2 The minor's counsel also argued, in the alternative, that the INS had
effectively consented because he had notified the INS on three separate occasions that he
was petitioning the state court to declare the minor a dependent and the INS had not
objected. See L at 4. Moreover, for the second notice, given three months before the
state court issued its order, the minor's counsel informed the INS's "trial attorney and the
immigration judge that he was pursuing a permanent guardianship in the Norfolk County
Probate and Family Court, as well as a special juvenile immigrant petition with the [INS]
district director." See Ud at 5. According to the AAU's decision, the INS trial attorney did
not object in any way and even agreed to continue the INS hearing specifically to allow the
minor to pursue the state court guardianship. See iL Despite the INS trial attorney's lack
of objection and willingness to continue the removal hearing, the AAU concluded that the
record did not show that the Attorney General "expressly and specifically consented" to
the dependency order and found consent lacking. Id.
219. The 1999 INS memorandum did not further clarify the meaning of "constructive
custody" although it indicated that minors who were not in INS custody need not obtain
the Attorney General's consent prior to juvenile court exercise of jurisdiction. See Cook,
supra note 198.
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privately run facilities. Such a broad interpretation of the 1997
amendments would carry severe consequences. Under this reading,
juvenile courts would be unable to enforce state child welfare laws
when a minor is released to parents or other adults who place the
minor at risk of danger.
C. How the Attorney General Should Interpret the 1997 Amendments
The 1997 SIJ amendments shifted significant responsibility for
protecting immigrant children from state courts and child welfare
systems to the INS. Before the amendments took effect, states could
be counted on to protect all children who are abused, neglected, or
abandoned. With state courts barred from exercising jurisdiction
over certain immigrant minors, the INS may need to increase its
capacity to protect children under its legal custody. Furthermore, the
1997 amendments prevent state courts and child welfare systems from
protecting children detained in INS-contracted facilities, such as local
juvenile halls or foster facilities. Until the conditions in these
facilities improve or the INS establishes more rigorous monitoring
systems, children in these facilities will remain vulnerable. In essence,
by restricting state court powers, the 1997 jurisdictional provision
creates a void in protective services that the INS or another federal
program will need to replace.
To address the gap in protective services, the Attorney General
could promulgate regulations interpreting the 1997 jurisdictional
provision to enable states to intervene in those cases in which the INS
is least equipped to respond, such as when the INS has released a
child to a family member or other responsible adult. State child
welfare systems already have response mechanisms that can
investigate reports quickly and more easily than the INS. This
interpretation of the 1997 provision also comports with the Flores v.
Reno settlement agreement reached one year prior to the
amendments' enactment.' The Flores settlement agreement sets out
a "nationwide policy for the detention, release, and treatment of
minors in the custody of the INS" and supersedes all previous INS
policies on the subject but does not supersede subsequent changes in
the law."' Under that agreement, minors whom the INS releases on
parole, by bond, or of their own recognizance are not deemed to be
220. Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544 (C.D. Cal. 1996)(stipulated settlement
agreement).
221. Id. at 6.
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under INS legal custody.' While the agreement neither expressly
defines the term "constructive custody" nor considers the SIJ statute,
it assumes as a general matter that release to family or another adult
relinquishes INS legal custody.' The agreement remains enforceable
against the INS and is not contradicted by any language in the 1997
SIJ amendments."
Under a Flores interpretation, the INS would limit the definition
of "constructive custody" to juveniles the INS detains and places in
facilities run by state or private agencies. In essence, this would
include juveniles for whom the INS continues to provide and pay for
shelter and care, such as foster homes or agencies, private facilities, or
state-operated facilities.' s Some negative consequences would still
occur under this definition of "constructive custody" as minors who
need child welfare services while in an INS placement would be
denied state and local child welfare services until the Attorney
General's consent could be obtained. Professionals who work with
minors in these facilities have observed that these children, while
detained by the INS, are not consistently receiving the kind of
services or treatment necessary for abused, neglected or abandoned
children."s If the INS improved conditions in detention facilities,
however, a greater number of children would be assured some form
of protection and services from either the INS itself or state systems.
So long as INS facilities remain at the current level of care, children in
those facilities would be denied the kind of treatment they need.
Alternatively, the Attorney General could grant consent
categorically when urgent and immediate state juvenile court action is
necessary.'7 For example, in most states, police officers or child
abuse investigators are authorized to take minors into custody when
they have "reasonable cause" or some other factual basis to believe
222. See idL at 11-12.
223. IM "The INS may terminate the custody arrangements [of children placed with
relatives or other adults] and assume legal custody of any minor whose custodian fails to
comply with the agreement [the adult has signed].... In any case in which the INS does
not release a minor.., the minor shall remain in INS legal custody."
224. See id. at 22 (addressing binding nature of agreement).
225. The Court's decision in Reno v. Flores clarifies that "[j]uveniles placed in these
facilities are deemed to be in INS detention 'because of issues of payment and
authorization of medical care."' Id- at 1445 (citing "Detention and Release of Juveniles,"
Final Rule, Supplementary Information, 8 C.F.R. Parts 212 and 242, 53 F.R. 17449 (May
17,1988).
226. See supra Section II.
227. The statute allows for juvenile courts to obtain jurisdiction once the Attorney
General (or her representative) "specifically consents." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(J)(27)(iii)(I).
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that the minor has been abused, neglected, or abandoned, or that the
minor's safety is at risk.' If a minor who needs child welfare
assistance is identified in a private INS contracted detention facility in
a Florida or a Texas juvenile hall, a police officer or child welfare
worker would be authorized to petition the state court to protect the
minor pursuant to the state's statutory guidelines and timetables.
This interpretation would reduce the risk that children would go
unaided while the Attorney General reviews a request for consent.
This interpretation also mitigates some of the INS's concerns about
immigration fraud because a police officer or child abuse investigator
would make an independent assessment of the minor's needs, rather
than the minor making allegations of abuse, neglect, or abandonment
on his or her own.
In other cases where urgency is not present, the INS regulations
should require a minimal threshold showing, such as a prima facie
evidentiary standard, to enable a minor to obtain Attorney General
consent.'M A threshold showing would prevent cases entirely without
merit from entering state court, while at the same time enabling
minors who genuinely need state child welfare protection to obtain a
hearing without delay. The INS could interpret the statute to allow
for consent within a certain period of time after the juvenile court has
protected the minor.' Juvenile courts could first exercise jurisdiction
228. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 305:
Any peace officer may, without a warrant, take into temporary custody a minor:
(a) When the officer has reasonable cause for believing that the minor is a
person described in Section 300 [a juvenile court dependent under state law]
and, in addition, that the minor has an immediate need for medical care, or the
minor is in immediate danger of physical or sexual abuse, or the physical
environment or the fact that the child is left unattended poses an immediate
threat to the child's health or safety.
The California law also allows the officer to take custody without a warrant if the
minor is homeless and requires remedial care or is in a hospital and release to a parent
poses an immediate danger to the child's health and safety. See § 305(d).
229. In California, a child who is taken into custody by a state authorized individual,
such as a police officer, cannot be detained more than 48 hours unless a petition to declare
him a dependent of the juvenile court is filed within that period of time. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 313. At an initial detention hearing, which must be held on the next court
day after the petition is filed, a juvenile court may order continued detention if a "prima
facie showing has been made that the child comes within Section 300." CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 319. See Catherine Wilson, Judge Promises to Decide Somali Teen-ager's
INS Case Soon, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 17, 2000 (The attorney "who represents the
youth through the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, charged the INS set an
unreasonably high standard for the boy to meet" in order to obtain the Attorney
General's consent.).
230. The statute does not state when consent must occur. See 8 U.S.C. §
and later provide notice to the Attorney General, thereby giving the
INS an opportunity to intervene.
These interpretations of the 1997 amendments would reduce the
risk of harm to children who need the protection the child welfare
system provides and cannot wait for the Attorney General to consent
before receiving protective care. These interpretations are also more
faithful to the overall purposes of the SIJ statute than the various
policies the INS has applied since 1997.
D. A Legislative Proposal for an Alternative Federal Jurisdictional Rule
The need for a federal jurisdictional rule to govern the division
of power between state courts and the INS, particularly over minors
in INS legal custody, was illustrated in Gao, C.M.K., and the other
cases discussed in Section IV. The preemption analysis of Section IV
also highlighted two kinds of situations where a clearer jurisdictional
rule would help resolve disputes between state courts and the INS:
first, when a state court asserts jurisdiction over a minor already in
INS legal custody and no determination has been made regarding the
minor's immigration or placement status; and second, when a state
court makes a determination as to the placement status of a minor
that conflicts with the INS's immigration decision.
The 1997 jurisdictional rule represents one approach to
addressing these conflicts and favors greater federal power over
immigrant children. Driven largely by concerns about immigration
fraud, Congress passed the 1997 SIJ amendments granting the INS
greater authority over immigrant children and reducing the power of
state courts. In this way, the 1997 law represents a shift away from
the structure of the 1990 version of the SIJ statute, which relied
primarily on state courts to make the substantive determinations
regarding a child's experience of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. As
discussed above, a shift of responsibility away from state courts may
leave some immigrant children vulnerable and without protection.
Congress could enact a more balanced rule that enables state
courts initially to take jurisdiction over minors in INS legal custody
but that retains the INS's authority regarding a child's immigration
status. The hypothetical rule could enable state and local child
welfare systems to protect any immigrant child without waiting for
1101(a)(J)(27)(iii)(I). A 1999 INS memorandum states: "In the case of juveniles in INS
custody, the Attorney General's consent to the juvenile court's jurisdiction must be
obtained before proceedings on issuing a dependency order for the juvenile are begun."
See Cook, supra note 198.
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INS approval. Under this hybrid rule, the INS would be freed from
many of the administrative burdens associated with the 1997 law and
could focus on the task of immigration regulation. If the INS
obtained a final removal order, the INS could deport the minor and
override a state court's determination that the minor should remain in
the United States. Conversely, if a state court concluded that a child
should be sent out of the United States to reunify with his or her
parents, for example, the state court would need final approval from
the INS if the minor's immigration status were in question. With
regard to SIJ petitions, the hypothetical rule need not alter the
existing standards of review.
The hybrid rule improves upon the 1997 rule by increasing the
likelihood that undocumented children will obtain protection and
services when there is risk of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. The
proposed rule is premised on the fact that states and local child
welfare agencies presently have greater capacity and expertise than
the INS to respond to emergency incidents involving child abuse,
neglect, or abandonment. This article does not argue that state or
local governments are intrinsically better equipped than the federal
government to address matters pertaining to children. To the
contrary, if Congress or the INS created a federal system to respond
to child abuse, neglect, and abandonment, it might be unnecessary to
rely upon states to perform the function of protecting immigrant
children. At the present time, however, the federal branch has left
this responsibility to the states, all of which have established child
welfare systems. Until this state-based structure is changed, state
courts and child welfare systems should retain the authority to
respond to incidents of child abuse, even when the incident involves
an undocumented child in INS legal custody.
A hybrid rule that requires federal deference to a state court's
initial exercise of jurisdiction and protective custody would advance
federal goals to protect minors who have suffered family abuse,
neglect, or abandonment."' Under the 1997 rule, state courts cannot
exercise jurisdiction over many minors, and the protections conferred
by child welfare laws are unavailable to these children. If a
deferential federal standard were applied to state juvenile court
jurisdiction, state courts would not be limited in their power to
protect these minors.
231. The SIJ statute and the Violence Against Women Act represent federal
recognition that undocumented children should be protected from abuse and violence by
family members.
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Congress would also avoid unnecessary duplication by delegating
the responsibility for evaluating such cases to state courts and child
welfare systems. Annually, state and local child welfare systems
monitor tens of thousands of children who are under the protection of
state courts. By contrast, the INS granted only 430 SIJ applications in
1997 and detains a few thousand minors each year by placing them in
contracted facilities. To conserve federal resources, Congress could
continue to rely upon state child welfare systems instead of
establishing another bureaucracy that may respond to only a few
hundred abuse, neglect, and abandonment cases annually.
Furthermore, if state courts retained authority over children in INS
legal custody, the INS would not bear the responsibility for evaluating
a child's history of abuse, neglect, or abandonment, a task which
introduces conflicts of interest with its immigration regulation duty.
This task is better left to state courts and child welfare systems which
are specifically designed to make "best interest" determinations.
Another alternative to a strong federal rule would be a rule that
favors greater state power to protect undocumented children in INS
legal custody. Under a rule favoring state court authority, the INS
would not only defer to a state court's initial exercise of jurisdiction
and grant of protective custody but also the final placement decision.
For example, if an undocumented child whom the INS placed in a
private facility was deemed eligible for dependency, the state court
could take the minor into protective custody, declare her dependent,
and place her with a foster family. The INS would not be able to
initiate immigration actions or proceedings against her until the state
court terminated its jurisdiction over the minor.
This hypothetical rule favoring state court power would ensure
that children who have suffered abuse, neglect, or abandonment
receive not only short-term child welfare protection but also long-
term protection. The rationale for providing long-term protection is
similar to the justification for the SIJ statute itself. Immigrant
children who are victims of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment may
have no family that can support them. The SIJ statute relies upon
state child welfare systems to provide what may be the only means of
shelter, support, and care for these children. When they reach the age
of majority or no longer require the court's protection, the INS could
deport them if it chooses to initiate removal proceedings. Having
received some services and protection from the dependency system,
they may be better prepared as adults to adjust to a forced return to
their country of origin than they would have been as a child. Again,
such a rule is premised on the assumption that state child welfare
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systems presently are better equipped to protect individual children
than the federal INS.
Of course, a jurisdictional rule that requires greater INS
deference to state juvenile courts would suspend the INS's authority
to remove any child in the dependency system from the United
States. The practical impact of such a rule is that an undocumented
child could gain a period of reprieve from deportation. The
possibility that minors would fully thwart federal immigration
restrictions, however, would be no greater than in other contexts
where a state court has exercised jurisdiction over an immigrant, such
as in criminal prosecutions or juvenile delinquency adjudications, In
practice, the INS usually waits until the period of incarceration or
court protective custody is completed. Because most states terminate
juvenile dependency jurisdiction when the minor reaches the age of
majority (or shortly thereafter), it is unlikely that a minor would
remain under state protective custody beyond the age of twenty-one.
State criminal sentences, by contrast, may last for years, even
decades, depending on the severity of the crime. Once state custody
terminates, federal authorities may exercise control and remove the
individual from the United States. Under a deferential jurisdictional
rule, the immigrant ultimately does not receive any shield from
federal immigration restrictions. The hypothetical strong state rule
would merely suspend enforcement of immigration restrictions while
significantly advancing Congress' goal of protecting abused,
neglected, and abandoned children.
Both alternative jurisdictional rules offer benefits that the 1997
rule does not. Most important, the two hypothetical rules would
grant state courts more authority to protect those minors in INS legal
custody. Only the rule favoring stronger state court power might give
minors, not otherwise eligible to remain in the United States, some
reprieve from the impact of immigration restrictions. The more
balanced hypothetical rule retains the INS's authority over the
immigration status of undocumented children. In enacting one of the
proposed rules, Congress could address immigration fraud concerns
without sacrificing its goal of protecting immigrant children.
VI. Federalism, State Sovereignty, and the SIJ Statute
In the preceding sections, this article described how the 1997
amendments to the SIJ statute might place INS-detained minors who
have suffered abuse, neglect, or abandonment at risk of further harm.
By limiting state court jurisdiction over minors in INS custody, the
1997 jurisdictional rule also curtailed the states' power to regulate
individuals within their territories. Section VI considers whether the
1997 amendments would be vulnerable to constitutional challenge on
federalism and state sovereignty grounds if they impose mandatory
duties, such as identification and reporting requirements, on states
and local governments. This section also discusses the applicability
of federalism principles to immigration regulation. Although the
Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue, the article discusses a
handful of lower court decisions that have examined the issue. Based
on this limited body of case law, the article argues that federal
immigration laws are subject to the constraints of federalism despite
the exceptionally broad authority the federal government exercises in
the arena of immigration.
A. The Possible "Commandeering" Effect of the 1997 SIJ Amendments
In several cases during the past three decades, the Supreme
Court has applied federalism principles to restrain federal power and
thereby shield states from excessive federal intrusion2 2 Generally,
Congress has the authority to encourage states to act or regulate in a
specified way by offering incentives such as federal funding. 3
Congress may also "occupy" an area of regulation and preclude states
from regulating in that area unless they conform to federal
requirements.2 But Congress has more limited power to mandate
states to implement a federal program without offering an
opportunity for states to decline involvement. The Supreme Court
has found unconstitutional federal laws that "commandeer" state
legislative or executive processes "by directly compelling them to
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program."'
232. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-35 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985); Hodel v. Virginia Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See, generally, LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 860 (3d ed. 2000).
233. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (conditioning receipt of
federal tax benefit on state compliance with requirement that bonds be issued in
registered form); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (conditioning grant of federal
funds on state adoption of a minimum drinking age requirement).
234. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2268-69 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1621 (1998)) (requiring states to comply with federal requirements as a condition of
granting benefits to certain immigrants).
235. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161. The "commandeering" language was
first described in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S.
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With regard to the 1997 SIJ amendments, it is difficult to
determine whether concerns about federalism are warranted because
regulations have not been promulgated that indicate how the
jurisdiction-limiting provision will impact states. The provision states
that "no juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the custody
status or placement of an alien in the actual or constructive custody of
the Attorney General unless the Attorney General specifically
consents to such jurisdiction."" On its own, the provision does not
define what state courts must do to ensure they do not improperly
exercise jurisdiction over minors in the Attorney General's custody.
In 1998, however, the INS issued a memorandum stating that a
"formal mechanism" will be established and that state juvenile courts
and child welfare agencies will be required "to work in concert to
establish formal communication links for the implementation of this
statute."'3 '7 The memorandum goes on to say that a proposed
rulemaking process would be initiated that "will inform state juvenile
courts of their responsibility under the new statute."m
In comparison to the 1997 law, the 1990 SIJ statute did not
require state participation or directly impose any burdens upon states.
Although a minor must enter the dependency system in order to
become eligible for SIJ status, the SIJ law does not require states to
accept undocumented children into child welfare systems. 9 Thus,
only the 1997 statute may introduce new responsibilities for state
child welfare systems.
Pursuant to the 1997 law, the INS could require states to identify
whether minors who come to their attention are in the Attorney
General's custody. The INS could require state courts to ask minors
about their immigration status or conduct an investigative search of
minors' backgrounds before the state courts exercise jurisdiction.
264, 288 (1981), in which the Court upheld a federal law because it did not commandeer
the states into regulating mining. See id.
236. See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) (amended on November 27, 1997). The
amended statute also required proof that the juvenile court rendered its decision to
address abuse, neglect, or abandonment rather than to enable the minor to obtain lawful
immigration status. It also added language to the statute requiring that the grant of an SIJ
petition required the Attorney General's express consent.
237. See Cook, supra note 194, at 2.
238. See id.
239. Other federal laws, the Constitution or state constitutions, however, may require
states to provide protective services to undocumented children. See Carolyn S. Salisbury,
Comment: The Legality of Denying State Foster Care to Illegal Alien Children: Are Abused
and Abandoned Children the First Casualties in America's War on Immigration?, 50 U.
MIAMI L. REv 633 (1996).
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Otherwise, state courts might inadvertently exercise jurisdiction over
minors in INS legal custody. In addition to verification requirements,
the INS may need to impose a notification requirement upon states to
ensure that state courts properly return minors identified as being in
the Attorney General's custody to the INS. Congress has already
instituted verification requirements as a condition of receiving federal
funding under the 1996 federal welfare reform law. Pursuant to the
welfare law, states must verify an individual's immigration status as a
condition of providing federally funded foster care to that
individual.2" The 1996 welfare law does not, however, require states
to report an individuals' immigration status to the INS.
The 1997 SIT jurisdictional rule would be vulnerable to a
federalism challenge if the INS requires state or local employees, such
as police officers or child abuse investigators, to perform
identification, reporting, or notification functions in order to comply
with the jurisdiction-limiting provision.24' In 1997, in Printz v. United
States, the Supreme Court struck down the federal Brady Gun Law
for impermissibly "commandeering" state law enforcement officers to
perform criminal background checks and certifications for individuals
seeking to purchase firearms.24 The Court concluded that the federal
law unconstitutionally compelled state executives to implement a
240. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) of 1996 imposed verification requirements as a condition states must fulfill in
order to provide federal public benefits to certain immigrants. 8 U.S.C. § 1642. The act
states that the Attorney General shall define procedures "requiring verification that a
person applying for a Federal public benefit... is a qualified alien and is eligible to
receive such benefit." 8 U.S.C. § 1642(a)(1). This provision of PRWORA requires states
to verify the immigration status of individuals as a condition of providing federal TANF,
SSI, foster care, adoption payments and other public benefits to those individuals. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1641 (defining "Federal public benefit"); 8 U.S.C. § 1641 (defining "qualified alien"). I
am grateful to Deeana Jang, Asian Pacific Islander American Health Forum, and Tanya
Broder, National Immigration Law Center, for helping me understand the effect of
PRWORA.
241. Compliance with the SIJ statute may impose additional burdens upon states that
are separate from PRWORA's requirements. Although PRWORA already requires
states to verify the immigration status of minors who receive federal foster care benefits,
PRWORA probably does not require states to verify the immigration status of a minor if
they choose to pay for that minor's care with state foster care funds instead of federal
benefits. Furthermore, PRWORA does not require states to report information gathered
about an individual to the INS.
242. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-35 (1997) (striking down the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act). See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 144
(invalidating a federal environmental law that required states to develop a plan for the
disposal of radioactive waste generated within the state, and to take title to the waste if the
state failed to dispose of it properly.).
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federal program and gave states no choice regarding their
participation. The Brady Law placed significant investigative and
reporting burdens on state law enforcement officials that the
Supreme Court determined violated state sovereignty. Printz's
restrictions on federal power could also be applied to strike down the
1997 jurisdictional law if it requires state or local child abuse
investigators to conduct detailed background checks and
certifications on the immigration status of minors taken into state
custody. 43 As the Supreme Court noted in Printz, "Congress cannot
circumvent the prohibition [against commandeering] by conscripting
the State's officers directly."2'
Even if states are given some flexibility in how they comply with
the amended SIJ statute, mandatory state participation in a program
that imposes fiscal or administrative burdens might still be vulnerable
to constitutional challenge. In New York v. United States, the
Supreme Court invalidated a federal environmental law that required
states to develop a plan for the disposal of radioactive waste
generated within the state, and to take title to the waste if the state
failed to dispose of it properly. 245 The Court determined that, while
Congress characterized the toxic waste "take-title" provision as an
"incentive" program that gave states some flexibility, states ultimately
were presented with no real choice regarding their participation in the
federal program.246 Either the states adopted the federal regulatory
scheme or took title to the waste and accepted liability for its disposal
- both "choices" required the states to enact a program in compliance
with the federal statute.247 Following this reasoning, the Court
concluded that the "choice" Congress presented to states "is no
choice at all."2"
243. Compare this hypothetical federal law with the federal laws upheld in the Second
Circuit's decision, City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (1999). See infra note
259. The federal laws upheld in City of New York did not impose reporting or verification
requirements upon states or localities, but instead invalidated New York City's law that
restricted city employees from voluntarily providing information about the immigration
status of aliens to the INS. Federal imposition of actual duties upon states or localities
would be significantly more burdensome and therefore more likely to be struck down as
unconstitutional.
244. 521 U.S. at 935.
245. New York, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
246. Id at 174-77.
247. See id at 174-75. ("A state may not decline to administer the federal program.
No matter which path the State chooses, it must follow the direction of Congress." Id. at
177.).
248. Id. at 176.
In the case of the SIJ jurisdictional provision, the law is more
likely to survive constitutional challenge if states are given a viable
method for opting out. Congress may create incentives for states to
participate, such as conditioning funding on participation, but a law
would be vulnerable to a state sovereignty challenge if it required
participation. To avoid a federalism challenge, the INS could impose
no specific burdens on states and allow them to develop their own
methods of ensuring that their courts do not improperly exercise
jurisdiction over minors in INS legal custody. The 1997 SIJ
jurisdictional provision does not impose any specific burdens upon
states. By contrast, the laws the Court invalidated in Printz and New
York mandated that states comply with detailed regulatory schemes.
One problem with allowing states to develop their own methods of
ensuring the proper exercise of jurisdiction is that uniformity in state
practices will be lost. Some states might voluntarily institute effective
protocols for screening minors, but many would not. If a state court
inadvertently exercised jurisdiction over a minor, the INS or another
federal agency would have to intervene and assert federal authority
over the minor.
B. The Applicability of Federalism Principles to Federal Immigration
Regulation
The analysis presented above presumes that federalism
principles, such as the "commandeering" rule, apply to immigration
regulation just as they apply to other federal regulation. While
federalism has functioned as a viable check against a broad range of
federal regulations,249 the Supreme Court's recent rulings restraining
congressional regulation on federalism grounds have been
predominantly in the area of Commerce Clause legislation." The
Supreme Court has yet to consider whether federal law regulating
non-citizen immigrants and their treatment in the United States could
violate federalism principles."1
There are reasons for treating federal immigration policy
differently from other federal laws. For over a century, Congress'
249. During the past decade the Court has applied such principles to strike down or
restrict Commerce Clause legislation regulating employment discrimination, toxic waste
management, the possession of guns near schools and gun sales. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452 (1991); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995); Printz v United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
250. See supra text accompanying note 249.
251. In the nineteenth century, the Court considered a series of cases involving state
taxation of foreign travelers. The Passenger Cases, 42 U.S. 283 (1849).
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authority over the regulation of admission, expulsion, and
naturalization of immigrants has been deemed "plenary" and largely
immune from judicial oversight."a "Over no conceivable subject is
the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the
admission of aliens," the Court proclaimed."3 Commentators have
pointed out, however, that Congress's expansive authority diminishes
once it moves beyond the direct regulation of immigration and begins
to regulate the behavior and treatment of non-citizen immigrants who
are already within the country.' On several occasions, the Supreme
Court and lower courts have struck down federal immigration
legislation.z" These decisions constitute a significant body of law
where the Court has found that traditional constitutional protections
must be accorded to immigrants. Nonetheless, nearly all of the
decisions limiting Congress' power with respect to immigration and
alienage have been in the area of individual rights, not states' rights.
Recognizing Congress' broad powers to regulate immigration,
one might argue that a different brand of federalism should apply
when Congress legislates in this arena. Arguably, states do not even
have a legitimate basis to challenge federal immigration regulation on
states' rights grounds because Congress regulates in this area to the
exclusion of states. How can Congress violate state sovereignty, one
might ask, when it regulates in an area over which states cannot
exercise authority?
While it would be impermissible for states to regulate
immigration matters per se, non-citizen immigrants are present within
states' territories, and states must be able to regulate their behavior.
Criminal laws, child custody laws, child welfare laws, public benefit
252. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,792 (1977). See also, Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,215 (1953).
253. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799-800; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730
(upholding various denials of immigration benefits to undocumented persons or non-
citizen immigrants).
254. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 865 (1989) (describing Congress' power over cases "inside" and
"outside" of immigration law); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden
Door, 1993 WIs. L. REv. 965, 989 (applying similar distinction); Linda S. Bosniak,
Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047,
1056-57 (describing immigration law and alienage law categories).
255. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (First Amendment
challenge); Alemeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (Fourth
Amendment challenge); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (Fifth and
Sixth Amendment challenges); and Equan v. INS, 844 F.2d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 1988)
(Eighth Amendment challenge).
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laws, and many other state laws validly regulate these individuals.
State child welfare laws clearly fall within the realm of legitimate state
authority, and states regularly take undocumented minors into
protective custody.56  Indeed, federal and state powers overlap
significantly with respect to the treatment of minors who may require
custody, shelter and protection.
Until the Supreme Court addresses the issue, it will remain
undecided whether principles of federalism would have the same
effect on congressional regulation of immigration matters.257
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue,
lower courts have applied the Court's federalism standards to federal
immigration legislation. 8 In City of New York v. United States, New
York City challenged portions of the 1996 federal welfare reform and
immigration laws that invalidated the city's law prohibiting
government employees from voluntarily providing information about
undocumented immigrants to the INS. 9 At issue in the litigation was
whether Congress could require state and local governments to assist,
or at least not obstruct, federal immigration enforcement. The city
argued that state sovereignty forbade Congress from interfering with
a state's control over its workforce and its power to determine the
256. In fact, Florida enacted a statute requiring that the child welfare agency provide
services to undocumented minors after litigation was brought alleging that the agency was
discriminating against these children and denying them services. Fla. Admin. Code 65C-
9.001, et seq. See Doe v. Towey, No. 94-1696-CIV (S.D. Fla. amended complaint filed
Sept. 22, 1994) (challenging Florida's child welfare system's practice of excluding
undocumented children from receiving child welfare protection and services) (on file with
author).
257. The Supreme Court's discussion of "commandeering" in Printz did not indicate
that the substantive area of regulation-be it immigration or gun sales-makes a
difference for purposes of federalism analysis. The "commandeering" test follows the
trend the Supreme Court began in 1985, focusing on the procedural aspects rather than
the substantive area of the federal law being reviewed. By overruling National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), in Garcia, the Court moved away from what it
concluded was an unworkable method of identifying the substantive regulatory areas that
might be deemed traditionally under state control. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia the
Court announced that procedural safeguards inherent in the federal system of government
would prevent the federal government from violating state sovereignty. Id. at 551.
258. See California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir. 1997); Arizona v.
United States, 104 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 1997); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 28
(2d Cir. 1996); Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094, 1097 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1674 (1996); New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 465 (3d Cir. 1996); Texas v.
United States, 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1997).
259. 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999) (reviewing challenges to Section 434 of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act and Section 642 of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act which negated the effect of New
York's standing Executive Order 124 issued originally by Mayor Edward Koch in 1989).
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duties of state employees in handling confidential information.2" In
rejecting the city's argument, the Second Circuit observed that the
federal law was worded so that it did not require city employees to
actually report to the INS, but instead forbade the city from inhibiting
any voluntary employee from reporting. The court determined that
Congress was not compelling city employees to act but was nullifying
the city's law that prohibited city employees from voluntarily acting.261
In City of New York, the city singled out the INS as the only
agency that would be denied information. 2 The discriminatory
targeting of the INS, the court noted, was a strong indication that the
city was interfering with immigration regulation.263 Moreover, the
court was troubled by the fact that the city had not alleged that any
specific local policies or practices would be burdened by the federal
laws.26 The court determined that the city's targeting of the INS and
its inability to show how legitimate city practices would be harmed
were strong indicators that the city was more interested in obstructing
federal policy than avoiding burden to local functions.
Based on the rule articulated in City of New York, mandatory
identification, reporting or notification requirements are at risk of
violating federalism principles. In City of New York, the federal law
did not require state or local government employees to perform any
activities. The court found, therefore, that no local practices were
burdened. Instead, the federal law invalidated an existing local
executive order that forbid state employees from reporting on their
own. The Second Circuit expressly left open the possibility that the
city could mount a successful as-applied challenge that demonstrated
how the federal law burdened the operation of city programs and
thereby commandeered the city's employees. 5 With regard to the
1997 SIJ amendments, the jurisdictional rule would be less vulnerable
to constitutional attack if state and local employees were not required
260. See ido at 35-37.
261. See id-
262. Id The court expressed concern that the city rule "singles out a particular federal
policy," namely the INS's regulatory practices for non-cooperation while allowing free
sharing of information with "the rest of the world." Idt at 37.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 37.
265. See City of New York, 179 F.3d at 36. The "City has chosen to litigate this issue in
a way that fails to demonstrate an impermissible intrusion on state and local power to
control information obtained in the course of official business or to regulate the duties and
responsibilities of state and local governmental employees.... The City's facial challenge
thus rests entirely on... inference." Id
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to engage in prescribed tasks that impose burdens on states and local
governments.
What is striking about the analysis the Second Circuit applied in
City of New York is the absence of any discussion that the federal
legislation being challenged should be treated differently because it
regulated the treatment of immigrants. In several cases brought
during the 1990s by state litigants, courts also evaluated the
challenged immigration legislation without an apparent change in the
federalism analysis. During a period of increasing national anti-
immigrant sentiment, states alleged that the federal government
failed to properly control the influx of illegal immigrants. 2 This
failure, they argued, imposed fiscal and other burdens upon states in
violation of the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional
provisions.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of California's challenge provides a
representative example of the straightforward federalism analysis
courts applied in reviewing the various states' claims.267 The court
examined the alleged impact of increased immigration on the state's
expenditures for Medicaid, prisons, and schools. It concluded that
under the rubric of the Tenth Amendment, Congress had not
compelled any state action in violation of the commandeering
principle but, rather, the state had imposed the burdens on itself,
either as a function of its own legislation (prison spending) or by
choosing to participate in a federal funding program (Medicaid).'
Public education, the court noted, was mandated by the Constitution,
not Congress.269 Under the approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit, if
a federal law violated the commandeering rule, it would be struck
down just like other federal laws.27
266. California, 104 F.3d at 1090; Arizona, 104 F.3d at 1096; Padavan, 82 F.3d at 28;
Chiles, 69 F.3d at 1097, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1674 (1996); New Jersey, 91 F.3d at 465;
Texas, 106 F.3d 661. For example, the State of New Jersey alleged that "'as a direct result
of the federal government's failure to control its international borders and implement and
abide by its laws, the State of New Jersey is improperly forced to bear the financial and
administrative costs"' of imprisonment and education of undocumented immigrants. New
Jersey, 91 F.3d at 465.
267. California, 104 F.3d at 1090, 1092 (relying upon South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203, 207-11 (1987), for federal funding analysis). See also, Padavan, 82 F.3d at 28-29
(applying "commandeering" analysis set forth in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992)); New Jersey, 91 F.3d at 466-67 (same); Texas, 106 F.3d at 665-67 (same)).
268. California, 104 F.3d at 1092. See also, Padavan, 82 F.3d at 28-29; New Jersey v.
United States, 91 F.3d at 466-67.
269. See California, 104 F.3d at 1093.
270. The other courts hearing these cases also applied a straightforward federalism
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
The political question doctrine is one possible basis upon which
federal immigration policy might be accorded different treatment.
Several courts described the states' demands for relief to be "non-
justiciable political questions," and noted that Congress has exclusive
authority over matters pertaining to the admission of immigrants."
The courts' concern with the political question doctrine, however, was
more attributable to the fact that the states had not identified any
specific federal law that commandeered state action. Instead, the
states articulated a generalized problem that the federal government's
inaction had allowed too many immigrants to remain within the
states' territories and utilize state resources. It would be difficult for
a court to conclude that the federal government had commandeered
states to expend their resources based solely upon the absence of
federal action. The state litigants failed to demonstrate that the
burdens shouldered by states were actually imposed by any federal
regulations rather than by the presence of immigrants in the states.
Furthermore, the remedy sought by the states would have
required the courts to overhaul an entire area of federal policy.
Several courts noted that the states' claims would require the courts
to evaluate the best way to implement and enforce the immigration
laws, tasks that the courts considered themselves ill-equipped to
perform.'m These far-reaching remedies demanded by the states were
another reason the courts categorized their challenges as politically
non-justiciable. Thus, despite the courts' rejection of the states'
claims, these decisions leave open the possibility that a more narrowly
crafted federalism challenge to federal immigration policy would be
deemed justiciable. A federalism challenge would also have greater
likelihood of success if it targeted a specific federal law or regulation,
instead of an entire area of regulation-such as immigration policy.
A common characteristic shared among the state challenges was
the indication that the states were actively interfering with federal
immigration goals. In these cases, the states literally asked the courts
to evaluate how Congress and the INS should formulate and
implement INS policy. The states had not even challenged a
particular federal statute. Thus, while these state challenges to
analysis to the challenged immigration legislation. See, e.g., Padavan, 82 F.3d at 28-29
(applying "commandeering" analysis set forth in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992)); New Jersey, 91 F.3d at 466-67 (applying the sameanalysis).
271. See, e.g., California, 104 F.3d at 1093; New Jersey, 91 F.3d at 470; Texas, 106 F.3d
at 664-65.
272. New Jersey, 91 F.3d at 470; Padavan, 82 F.3d at 27; Texas, 106 F.3d at 666-67.
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federal immigration legislation were unsuccessful, the weaknesses in
their challenges were not related to the fact that immigration was the
substantive regulatory area being challenged. To the contrary, these
cases, along with City of New York, support the proposition that the
commandeering principle applies to federal immigration policy.
Conclusion
The beginning of this article presented the story of an immigrant
boy literally lost at sea and caught between competing conceptions of
federal and state power. This country's desire to protect a child in
need while also guarding its national borders created an international
spectacle that pitted many different parties and institutions against
each other, including the federal INS and a state court. If anything,
the Elian Gonzalez case illustrated that federal policy regarding the
treatment of undocumented children is riddled with unresolved
contradictions.
By focusing on the SIJ statute, this article has explored the
conflicts regarding the treatment of undocumented children, in
particular those who are abused, neglected, or abandoned. When
Congress enacted the statute in 1990, the goal of the statute was the
protection of abused, neglected and abandoned children. But other
federal immigration goals, such as fraud prevention, were not always
consistent with the goal of protecting children. On occasion, the
actions of the INS have undermined state child welfare policies or the
practices of state juvenile courts. As a result, undocumented children
were sometimes trapped in the middle. The federal and state
conflicts that arose compelled policymakers to consider whether the
balance of power between the federal government and states had to
be shifted, or at least clarified.
The 1997 amendments, and in particular the jurisdictional
provision, were an attempt to address the federal and state conflicts
by giving the INS significantly greater authority over minors in INS
legal custody. Although the 1997 jurisdictional provision sought to
eliminate SIJ fraud, it also restricted the states' ability to protect
children. Indeed, by restricting state court's jurisdiction over abused,
neglected or abandoned children, the 1997 amendments may
jeopardize immigrant children's lives, thus contravening the goals of
the SIJ statute.
This article recommends that Congress reevaluate the 1997
jurisdictional rule and consider either a more balanced jurisdictional
rule or one that favors state court authority over immigrant minors.
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By returning responsibility for child welfare to the states, the two
alternative rules presented in Section V would offer greater
protection to children who need child welfare assistance. Moreover,
the alternative rules would not significantly restrain the INS's ability
to prevent immigration fraud. The proposed rules would enable state
courts and the federal INS to concentrate on those tasks they are best
equipped to perform and thereby further Congress's goal of
protecting undocumented children who are abused, neglected, and
abandoned.
